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In the global field of antitrust law, policy paradigms are pushed and
pulled by forces analogous to those of the market. Policy entrepreneurs
(typically competition law agencies) operate in a setting where,
notwithstanding various cooperative platforms, competition and rivalry
occur and manifest themselves in a number of dimensions. This article is
thus premised on the notion that competition enforcers across
jurisdictions compete among themselves on a global ‘market’. It ventures
beyond extant scholarship by elaborating more fully on the modes
through which this competitive behavior is pursued. The primary
competitive relationship explored is that between enforcers in the United
States and enforcers in the European Union, but the article also accounts
for antitrust having ‘gone global’, with the multiplication of antitrust
jurisdictions and thus new entrants around the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Competitive Forces in Global Antitrust Enforcement
By rough analogy to other fields of activity, in the world of competition law,
competition authorities and competition law systems compete for what may
1
loosely be termed market share. With competition law, while notional degrees of
market share defy precise measurement, we might take as an imperfect proxy
certain observed isomorphic processes. Isomorphism should not necessarily be
understood as mimicry; actual and potential “buyers” of concepts and paradigms
may be sophisticated enough to absorb attractive ideas by way of a self-regarding
selective adaptation and vernacularization that partly or fully takes account of
local needs and other constraints such as the cultural infrastructure and political
(and political economy) constraints, as well as institutional resources,
(in)capacities and (dys)functions. A “transaction” can thus occur not only where
an isomorphic shift is purely mimetic but also where the shift is a matter of
degree or hybridization. Occasionally, exported ideas fail to take root in foreign
soil. They may have no chance to flourish due to resource/capacity constraints
and weak institutions and enforcement; or there may be a mismatch between
elite-level approximation or replication of foreign solutions and a country’s
cultural/multi-cultural norms or shifting political currents. And in the end, an

1. Foreign competition law approaches imposed on Latin American countries, largely as part of
conditional loan packages, illustrate how the leveraging of paradigms can backfire. See generally COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 9-11 (Eleanor Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); Julian Peña,
Competition Policies in Latin America, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ANTITRUST 732
(Philip Marsden ed., 2006).
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injudicious transaction may breed contempt, which may have far-reaching
2
consequences.
3
From the perspective of the “merchants” and “peddlers,” the more they can
stimulate isomorphic processes, the easier it will be to achieve greater degrees of
substantive, procedural, institutional and intellectual convergence across
4
jurisdictions. This objective dovetails with that of gaining, as it were, a large
share of the market. Attentive observers have cautioned that convergence is not
to be pursued as an inherently desirable goal; relative costs, risks and benefits as
well as capacities should be taken into account along with the particular
contextual fabric of the jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions that may be
5
interested in making a “purchase.” One risk may be that a foreign-spawned tool
or principle, which may be based on a chain of possibly contingent choices,
could exacerbate pre-existing problems. For example, a green light for territorial
restrictions agreed between non-competitors, which flashed on in the United
States in the late 1970s, was deemed inapposite in the European context, where
markets across the Continent tended to be, and in many cases still are, highly
6
fragmented (and not only because of enlargements to the East). Another risk
2. The backlash and shift toward socialism is described in more political terms in Jorge G. Castañeda,
Latin America’s Left Turn, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May-June 2006), available at http://sandovalhernandezj.people.
cofc.edu/r21.pdf. The impediments to successful transplants, and the importance of adequate pre-conditions,
have been highlighted in a substantial corpus of literature. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & JeanFrançois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003);
Tay-Cheng Ma, Legal Transplant, Legal Origin, and Antitrust Effectiveness, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 65
(2013). See also FRANZ KRONTHALER, IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW IN DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITION COUNTRIES 89-90 (2007). Diffusion as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon is discussed in
William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1 J. COMP. L. 237 (2004); William Twining, Social
Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J. L. SOC’Y 203 (2005). For a legal anthropology perspective, see Julia Eckert,
Who is Afraid of Legal Transfers?, in ORDER FROM TRANSFER: COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND
LEGAL CULTURE 171 (Günter Frankenberg ed., 2013).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Cf. DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND GLOBALIZATION 278 (2010).
5. See infra Part III.
6. The distinct, historically determined structure of the European economy is a factor relevant not just to
vertical restraints doctrine but to other areas of the law, as well as the application of Article 102 TFEU. For
example, fragmented markets may hinder the process of creative destruction or similar self-corrective
mechanisms. Cf. Gustatvo Ghidini & Emanuela Arezzo, La prospettiva costituzionale della tutela della
concorrenza [A Constitutional Perspective on the Protection of Competition], in ALLE FRONTIERE DEL DIRITTO
COSTITUZIONALE: SCRITTI IN ONORE DI VALERIA ONIDA [AT THE FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF VALERIA ONIDA] 859, 871 (Marilisa D’Amico & Barbara Randazzo eds., 2011) (Europe
“thus appears reluctant to entrust the protection of competition to a merely potential perspective [. . .]”)
(translation and emphasis are by the author of this article; the term ‘potential’ refers to pressures from potential
competition). See also John Vickers, Competition Law and Economics: A Mid-Atlantic Viewpoint, 3 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 1, 6 (2007) (“competitive self-righting mechanisms” in Europe may be less robust as compared
to the U.S. because of Europe’s history of extensively monopolized markets, largely as a result of government
intervention). Vickers also tentatively raises the point that, since Europe had not developed its private
enforcement capacities to any degree comparable to the enormous litigation apparatus in the U.S. (a gap the EU
is gradually and timidly addressing, although positive developments mainly concern only business-to-business
litigation), more rigorous standards for unilateral conduct in Europe may be less apt to inhibit desirable
aggressive competition on the part of dominant firms. See id.
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may be harm to competition law’s perceived legitimacy if a particular form of
competition law is pushed too hard on a culture deeply rooted in different prior
7
beliefs and values. The un-reflexive assumption that convergence between
systems, concepts and analytical approaches is desirable for its own sake has
8
therefore understandably been criticized. An additional critique that has been
aired is that if convergence were adopted by all actors and jurisdictions as an

7. See Thomas Cheng, Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence
of Global Competition Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 433, 489 (2012) (advocating culturally sensitive convergence,
and not opposing convergence as such). According to Cheng, the risk is linked to the relative permanence of
local cultural values, which do not change fundamentally despite forces of globalization. In this regard, he cites
Ronald Inglehart & Wayne Baker, Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,
65 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 19, 21-22 (2000). At page 22, Inglehart and Baker write: “Weber [in THE PROTESTANT
ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1904)] argued that traditional religious values have an enduring
influence on the institutions of a society. Following this tradition, Huntington [in THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996)] argues that the world is divided into eight major civilizations or
‘cultural zones’ based on cultural [and specifically, religious] differences that have persisted for centuries. [. . .]
Scholars from various disciplines have observed that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time
and continue to shape a society’s political and economic performance. For example, Putnam [in MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993)] shows that the regions of Italy in which
democratic institutions function most successfully today are those in which civil society was relatively well
developed in the nineteenth century and even earlier. Fukuyama [in TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995)] argues that a cultural heritage of ‘low-trust’ puts a society at a competitive
disadvantage in global markets because it is less able to develop large and complex social institutions. Hamilton
[in ‘Civilizations and Organization of Economies’, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 183 (Smelser
& Sedberg eds., 1994)] argues that, although capitalism has become an almost universal way of life,
civilizational factors continue to structure the organization of economies and societies: ‘What we witness with
the development of a global economy is not increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western
culture, but rather the continuation of civilizational diversity through the active reinvention and reincorporation
of non-Western civilizational patterns’ (p. 184).” Cheng would nevertheless likely agree that although culture is
slow to change and path dependencies tend to be durable, it does not follow that efforts to engender a
“competition culture” are futile. Mindful of the point made by Inglehart and Baker, expectations and strategies
of social change should be realistic and, to the extent possible, harmonious with the logic and philosophy of a
particular “cultural zone.” Furthermore, with respect to the developing world, some recommended “building
blocks” have been identified by, e.g., Sokol and Stephan: “In order to build competition culture, competition
authorities must choose their cases carefully so as to maximize positive media coverage, information
dissemination, and interest by ordinary members of the public. Bid-rigging cases [which most taxpayers can
avidly applaud] may be a good place to start.” D. Daniel Sokol & Andreas Stephan, Prioritizing Cartel
Enforcement in Developing World Competition Agencies, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 137, 153
(D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). Sequencing, strategic planning, and the
identification of genuine shared interests thus become avenues to dissolving or at least softening cultural
barriers, rather than trying to break through them.
8. For broader discussion of the advantages and risks of participation in global convergence, see generally
Cheng, supra note 7. For discussion of the rhetoric and mechanisms of convergence and a variety of
impediments to it, see GERBER supra note 4, at 281-292. Within the specific context of competition laws and
enforcement patterns in the European Union, the convergence process has rather unique dynamics which set it
apart from the subject of global convergence. See, e.g., Laurence Idot, Réflexions sur la convergence des droits
de la concurrence [Reflections on the convergence of competition laws], November 2012, 4-2012
CONCURRENCE
http://www.concurrences.com/Journal/Issues/No-4-2012/Articles-1371/The-convergence-ofcompetition.
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9

overriding goal, desirable innovation might be suppressed. Kerber and Budzinski
therefore plead for diversity and experimentation as part of a discovery procedure
10
needed to address Hayek’s problem of constitutional ignorance.
Furthermore, even supposing convergence were desirable, as things stand
today there are some areas of law (abuse of dominance in particular) in which
differences in objectives, implementation capabilities and institutions appear to
preclude the identification of any truly universal approach and thus render the
convergence enterprise, even as between developed countries let alone the rest of
11
the world, largely illusory.
Taking account of the risks, drawbacks and in some cases the
impracticability of convergence, and particularly where the “country of import”
is a developing or least developed country, its historical-cultural, social and
economic conditions may be so different that they are advised to be eclectic with
their choices, and to “develop their own brand of competition law, resisting
12
pressures to copy ‘international standards’ without regard to fit.” As noted later,
13
some of them are following this advice. Meanwhile, starting from somewhat
different, or rather overlapping, premises—and responding to the counter-risk
that this recommended diversity might lead to excessive fragmentation—one of
14
the catch phrases circulating in recent years has been “informed divergence.”
9. Cf. Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 35-36 (Michael
Greve & Richard Epstein eds., 2004).
10. Id. at 36-39, 55 (Hayekian “knowledge problem requires that an international system of competition
laws must sustainably produce variety and generate new knowledge”); See also OLIVER BUDZINSKI, THE
GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION: COMPETENCE ALLOCATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY 72-80 (2008); Wolfgang Kerber, The Theory of Regulatory Competition and Competition Law, in
ECONOMIC LAW AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD: ITS RULE FUNCTION AND ITS TOOL FUNCTION IN THE COMPETITION
OF SYSTEMS 27 (Karl Meessen ed., 2009).
11. See generally Giorgio Monti, Unilateral Conduct: The Search for Global Standards, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 345 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012).
12. Eleanor Fox, Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Competition Law
Fit for Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 273, 273 (Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor Fox, Michal Gal & David Gerber eds., 2012). Fox
recognizes that an internal evaluation, sensitive to local conditions and needs, may lead a jurisdiction to
conclude that the benefits of copying or otherwise embracing a global standard outweigh the disadvantages. But
she stresses the importance of making an informed choice. See id. at 286, 290; see also Eleanor M. Fox and
Michal S. Gal, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience (New York
Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-11), forthcoming in ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING
JURISDICTIONS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor Fox,
Michal Gal & David Gerber eds., 2015) (need for eclectic, tailored solutions). The costs and benefits to be
considered by a developing country when deciding whether to move closer to a competition model based on
neoclassical economics are discussed in detail by GERBER, supra note 4, at 13.
13. See discussion infra at section III.D.4.
14. Strictly speaking, and as originally used, “informed divergence” operates at the level of the diverging
actor, which (as highlighted particularly in footnote 12 and accompanying text) should be making wellinformed choices about whether to follow global standards. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 287, 374 (1997). The popularity
of the term ‘informed divergence’ stems from Slaughter’s later use of it in ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
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This reference to divergence may in reality be a long-term convergence
15
strategy. But it is a “soft” strategy that allows for flexibility, which is meant in
16
part to be a pressure valve enabling the convergence process to advance. The
concept of informed divergence seems to exhibit an inherent tension that is
unlikely ever to be fully resolved, even if such full resolution were desirable. It is
not inconceivable that one day we may see a move from markets toward
hierarchies or quasi-hierarchies: some form of top-down (and partial)
harmonization in some areas of competition law may occur. Such a development
would substantially change the character of discussions about convergence, and
the locus of debate might then shift to processes of splintering and drift. But most
would agree that top-down global harmonization of broad scope, e.g., via a WTO
framework agreement or via some new international institution, will not happen
17
18
in the foreseeable future. For some, this is just as well.
WORLD ORDER 24, 172 (2004). However, the term is helpfully also used ‘multilaterally’ to imply that the
relevant community of interest is or should be equally informed of, and that it understands or should
understand, the divergence and the reasons for it. Cf. John Fingleton, Competition Agencies and Global
Markets: the Challenges Ahead, Speech Given as Part of the Mellon Sawyer Seminar Series (June 5, 2009),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0909paper.pdf, at 27. Of course, if no brakes
were applied to the informed divergence concept, then the risk of unraveling would rear its head again, but the
group dynamics of the ICN tend to serve as a buffer against disintegrative tendencies.
15. Fingleton refers to the “interplay” between convergence and informed divergence. He also seems to
assume that divergent approaches will ultimately be phased out, in particular when developing economies reach
a certain stage of development. See Fingleton, supra note 14 at 27 (specifically, points 87 and 90). For the
notion that informed divergence is intended to lay the groundwork for possible long-term convergence, see
Eleanor Fox, John Fingleton and Sophie Mitchell, The Past and Future of International Antitrust: Gaps,
Overlaps and the Institutional Challenge, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION REGIMES: SELECTED ESSAYS 163
(David Lewis ed., 2013), at section V of the chapter. The interplay between convergence and divergence has
also been noted by other authors. See, e.g., Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case
Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 246 (2003).
16. A flexible margin for divergence is, of course, a reflection of the global preference, thus far, for soft
law solutions and soft institutions. In some cases, it may be that the divergence is not easily discerned from an
external point of view, as it emerges through a more subtle process of adaptation. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol,
International Antitrust Institutions, in COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 187, 196 (Andrew
Guzman ed., 2011) (“In soft law antitrust, broad principles in antitrust allow for each country to adopt the
language and theoretical underpinnings behind it in a manner that can be more easily incorporated within the
existing legal and political traditions. This flexibility allows for ‘fit’ within an existing tradition and is not a
pure transplant across legal systems . . . “). If broad principles are adopted with the possibility to frame them
within different theoretical perspectives, then a degree of divergence seems likely given high degrees of
heterogeneity across a large number of jurisdictions and “culture zones.” That is to say, “informed divergence”
may be a strategy of managed convergence but at the same time it is a conceptual description of what may be an
endemic feature of the international system when hard obligations have not been undertaken.
17. See, e.g., Fingleton, supra note 14, at 18; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger
Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1099 (2010); DANIEL CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 229 (2011). Crane suggests laying a foundation for plurilateral or multilateral hard
law gradually and issue-by-issue, beginning with procedure and progressing to substance and institutions. His
example is pre-merger notification, which could be standardized as a step toward a treaty on substantive merger
norms. See CRANE, supra at 243. On the need for hard law solutions for certain issue-specific challenges, see
also infra note 58.
18. One risk with a multilateral consensus-based agreement is to get stuck with a bad deal that can’t
feasibly be reversed, although a carefully crafted agreement might provide for a workable solution by its own
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While convergence is often a central point of emphasis in the modern global
antitrust conversation and cannot be ignored, the present article develops a
related but different theme: the interest here is on the supply side, and the drive to
increase market share, which may perhaps also be interpreted as the drive to
19
project soft power, to borrow Joseph Nye’s popular term. In this context, the
self-interest of key actors, in a broad sense, is not the whole story, but it plays a
20
central role. Another related dynamic at play is the distorted lens through which
many if not all of us see the world, a lens of self-certified enlightenment. Many
American antitrust lawyers seem predisposed to the sentiment that they
understand antitrust in a privileged way; after all, the U.S. was the undisputed
antitrust heavyweight champion for 70 years until the 1960s finally witnessed the
incipient influence of competition authorities in Bonn and Brussels. In Europe,
meanwhile, many at some level hold to the view that while competition law
principles and antitrust-type analytical tools took longer to develop in Europe,
lawyers there have surpassed the Americans in competition enlightenment, for
example because in Europe there is a somewhat richer history of competition law
ideas from which to draw. At least some European competition experts may feel
that while Chicago, or an alloyed version of Chicago, has been the slow death of
American antitrust, Europe has largely escaped this fate, and that even in the age
of the more economic approach (thought by many to be a post- or antiordoliberal approach with de-ethicizing overtones), it is the EU competition law
21
regime that keeps an otherwise largely unaccountable global industry honest.

terms. Apart from this, some argue that global hard law is in fact undesirable and inferior to the voluntary
system of soft convergence and cooperation that has developed in the last dozen years. See Anu Bradford,
International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for Nonbinding Regimes, in COOPERATION, COMITY
AND COMPETITION POLICY 319, 343 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2010) (“First, as cooperation under nonbinding
agreements is largely self-enforcing, the added value of a binding agreement with provisions for monitoring,
enforcement, and sanctions is trivial. Second, in the absence of coordinated domestic interest group support for
international antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement would not provide states with any domestic political
economy rents and therefore will remain a low national priority. Finally, the emerging voluntary convergence
will slowly eradicate negative externalities stemming from decentralized antitrust regimes, making the case for
a binding international agreement less compelling.”).
19. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS (2005).
20. The term “self-interest” is not primarily a reference to national welfare- or budget-maximizing
strategies, or profit-shifting in the sense of strategic trade theory. A government (and/or legislator) may well be
guided by such strategies, and if it (they) can (openly or subtly) dictate the policies of the competition authority
established in the jurisdiction concerned, the authority would no doubt act self-interestedly in this narrow sense
as well. Similarly, a competition authority may be co-opted directly by (globally active) commercial interests.
Without denying these possibilities, the reference to self-interest in the main text is concerned with a wider
range of motivations including, for example, the desire to achieve prestige and gain influence in a global
community of interest, and to respond to or anticipate competitive pressures generated by the activities of rival
authorities engaged in a similar game. These motivations seem particularly relevant where and to the extent that
competition authorities engaged in the global promotion of their own competition law regimes operate with
relative independence from globalized industry and from other organs of government.
21. A side note here is that, by its own terms, a “more economic approach” is not an ‘exclusively
economic approach’ (which probably cannot be practiced even in the U.S., not least because subtextual content
will always seep into competition law as conceived or as applied, as it can do in practically all areas of law).

161

2015 / Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust
The theme here, then, is the conscious/unconscious will to compete for
influence via the diffusion of ideas, paradigms, techniques, norm and institution
design, and so on. The term “competition” may fail to capture the simultaneous
cooperative efforts made among competition authorities, and in this sense the
22
alternative term “co-opetition” could be used. However, with some exceptions
the emphasis in this text is on competition and not cooperation; since the coopetitive dimensions are not explored in detail, this terminology is not used
either.
With regard to competition among competition authorities, the aim is not to
set out to prove that such competition produces good results, as it tends to do in
23
most real markets. Previous work suggests that “yardstick” competition among
competition law institutions (as opposed to the usual Tieboutian competition
among legislators analyzed in most discussions of regulatory competition, where
regulatees/voters can relocate or otherwise select laws) will indeed tend, in
24
general, to be welfare-enhancing. This is a sensible view; it seems quite
improbable that adequate agency self-improvement could take place in the
absence of competitive forces. I take the desirability of such yardstick
competition as a given and do no more than conduct an indicative survey of the
modes in which competition authorities compete globally through their activities.

Giorgio Monti has commented on this, explaining that “there are good reasons for the Commission to insist in
its public communications that its approach is only about using more economics, because contemporary EC
competition law is governed by: a distributive concern about ensuring consumer welfare (which is very difficult
to implement in certain instances); other non-economic values; a policy choice (at present at least) in favor of
efficiency in the short term over long term dynamic efficiencies; and a wish to see the law enforced to protect
the process of competition.” Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law: The Dominance of Economic Analysis?, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 12-13 (Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann
& Andreas Kellerhals eds. 2010) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Later in the text we return to consider
further the last of Monti’s themes, the protection of the “process of competition.”
22. See Daniel Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 235 (2000);
Damien Geradin & Joseph McCahery, Regulatory Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition
Debate, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF
GOVERNANCE 90, 93 (Jacinta Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (“a flexible mix of competition and
cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors”).
The regulatory co-opetition perspective does not require a mix of competition and cooperation. It is a broad
framework that accommodates pure competition, pure cooperation, and combinations of the two.
23. See Kerber & Budzinski, supra note 9, at 31.
24. Id., with references. This is not to say that competition law authorities never compete in ways
comparable to interjurisdictional competition between legislators (e.g., to attract scarce capital). For example, as
suggested supra note 20, it may be that competitive pressures on legislators sometimes create derivative
pressures on competition authorities; where this is so, a risk of regulatory degradation may arise. However, in
general, the assumptions that must hold in order to draw a direct analogy with regulatory competition may be
either unrealistic or too uncertain, or both. Cf. Eleanor Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up,
Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781-1807, 1789 (2000) (“[U]nlike the phenomenon of corporate
charters, states or nations are not in direct competition with one another to have the most desirable competition
law from the viewpoint of a firm that is a target of opportunity of that nation or state.”).
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B. Structure of this Article
The remaining text proceeds first by setting out how the structure of the
“market” is evolving and who the main players are (part II). Then, more
expansively it considers the processes by which competition in this sense
manifest themselves (part III). In this context, reference is made first of all to the
contrasting grand visions (hard law versus soft law, supranational versus
souverainiste, etc.) that have been embraced and pushed by the most prominent
rival jurisdictions as to how antitrust should be governed at the global level
(section III.A). The analysis then turns to international antitrust cooperation,
another competitive field where different strategic formats are employed and
where interest has intensified in the absence of formal multilateral antitrust
governance (sections III.B and III.C). A final focal point concerns “competition
in competition ideas” (section III.D). This form of competition concerns
alternative models with regard to what antitrust law should seek to achieve, and
consequently how it should be shaped. A summary of the main points concludes
the article (part IV).
II. WHICH MARKET PLAYERS?
Inevitable reference is made above and below to the United States and the
European Union. Historically, since most of the few then-existing competition
law regimes worldwide tended to be weak in terms of political power and/or
legal powers, and since they amounted in some cases to extensions of the
economic policies of the dominant political party (which in turn was beholden to
industry), the number of (generally) functional and influential regimes was
arguably three: those in the US, the EEC, and Germany. As Claus Ehlermann
25
says in a recent book review, DG IV faced two competitors, the most prominent
initially being the Bundeskartellamt (BKA), followed later by the federal
American agencies (counting the DOJ and FTC, which certainly compete inter
26
se, as a single rival ). Others have similarly referred (albeit without reference to

25. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 326, 327 (2014) (reviewing THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike Schweitzer eds., 2013).
26. With an already quite checkered history behind it, the influence and stature of the FTC from the 1960s
to the 1980s was at another low ebb, meaning that during this period DG IV’s perceived rival would have been
principally the DOJ. It may be added that U.S. federal antitrust enforcement also competes to some extent with
enforcement at the state level. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by
State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8, 10, 11, 13 (2004). The unstructured federalist
governance in the US is contrasted with the EU’s more juridified framework in Firat Cengiz, Management of
Networks between the Competition Authorities in the EC and the US: Different Polities, Different Designs, 3
EUR. COMPETITION J. 413 (2007). In further detail, see FIRAT CENGIZ, ANTITRUST FEDERALISM IN THE EU AND
THE US ch. 4 (2012).
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the BKA) to the “duopolistic” market on which the Community and the U.S.
27
operated as competitors.
But today we live in a multipolar world, to use an already-stock phrase, and
the transformation has occurred in a breathtakingly short time span. Against a
background of (i) globalized markets, (ii) increased exposure to international
trade including, occasionally, cartelized trade, (iii) sometimes, a perceived need
to attract foreign investment to support local development (although FDI
arguments are double-edged), and (iv) a process of reincarnation in Eastern
Europe following the disintegration of the USSR, the antitrust idea has grown
28
and reproduced, with the adoption of over 60 new competition laws in the 1990s
29
alone. Today there are more than 120 jurisdictions outfitted with competition
30
laws, even if it is important to recognize that the implementation and (funding
31
of) enforcement of such laws remains in many cases inadequate. With this
27. See William Kovacic, Dominance, duopoly and oligopoly: the United States and the development of
global competition policy, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. 39 (December 2010). Only a dozen years ago, after the
European Commission had attracted the notice of U.S. newspapers with its handling of the Boeing/McDonnellDouglas and GE/Honeywell merger cases, Fred McChesney made the rather anachronistic observation that the
U.S. was “still the dominant antitrust enforcer” but that the European Community was “striving to create a
niche for itself.” McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For and in the Field of
Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1436 (2003); McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation, 27
REG. 48, 55 (2004) (same quoted language).
28. The term “antitrust idea” is borrowed from Lawrence Sullivan and Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the
Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 197 (1998).
29. See, e.g., Imelda Maher & Anestis Papadopoulos, Competition agency networks around the world, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 60, 87, 345 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2012). David
Lewis has observed that in many countries the adoption of a competition law came too late: “[W]hat is
remarkable is how frequently liberal market policies were implemented without first introducing the
competition rules necessary to underpin the effective functioning of the newly ‘liberalized’ markets. This latter
omission has opened the door to monopolization and concomitant abuses, which have caused a great deal of the
misery and inequality that often accompanied liberalization.” Lewis, Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy
Grail or Attainable Objective?, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 228, 229 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas
Cheng & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). Two additional points seem nearly self-evident: first, it is not just
competition rules but a constellation of policies, which by purpose or effect become a country’s competition
policy, that deserve attention; second, without a minimal development of functioning institutions, the simple
adoption of competition rules will likely have only symbolic value, if any. See, e.g., William Kovacic,
Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2001); Michal Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust:
Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries, in UNCTAD, COMPETITION,
COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (2004).
30. See Hugh Hollman, William Kovacic & Andrew Robertson, Building Global Antitrust Standards: The
ICN’s Practicable Approach, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 89, 90 (Ariel
Ezrachi ed., 2012).
31. For a cross-country statistical and econometric analysis of around 100 countries, of whom 80 had
competition laws and 21 did not, see Abel Mateus, Competition and Development: What Competition Law
Regime?, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 123-34 (D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng & Ioannis
Lianos eds., 2013). Sixty-seven of the 80 countries with a competition law had established a competition
authority, but in only 30 countries did the authority appear to have resources suitable for its tasks; indeed, by a
stricter measure only 12 did. Mateus concludes at page 24 that “governments around the world have not placed
competition law enforcement among their highest priorities and have generally not endowed their [competition
authorities] with sufficient resources for effective enforcement.” (footnote omitted) Mateus, supra at 24.
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dispersion and diffusion of laws, the supply side of the market has become, as
32
Kovacic says, oligopolistic. China has risen—or pounced, and seems to have the
33
better part of the antitrust world mesmerized. In Japan, the JFTC in the last
decade has started to shake free of its dog-that-didn’t-bark past and to become a
34
serious, though still idiosyncratic, institution. Competition authorities in, for
example, Brazil and South Korea have become very active, and punch above
35
their weight. Australia, another significant antitrust jurisdiction, has had
remarkable regional and global influence, the pending “root and branch” review
36
notwithstanding; and for the future, India could potentially become yet another
important jurisdiction if the efforts of the Competition Commission can earn it
credibility and provoke cultural change. (This will likely take years to
accomplish; several factors will have to conspire if the necessary environment is
to be created.) Meanwhile, among the EU Member States it is no longer only the
Bundeskartellamt that commands attention; intra-regional competition occurs
routinely in the sister jurisdictions of the EU, paradoxically in parallel with an
intensification of interaction and cooperation, a sort of grand “concerted
practice” established formally by, and informally in connection with, Regulation
32. See Kovacic, supra note 27.
33. Two recent edited volumes indicate the torrent of competition law activity in China during the first
five years of its application. See CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 5 (Adrian Emch &
David Stallibrass eds., 2013); THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2013).
34. For arguments as to why the enforcement of competition law in Japan has been experiencing a longawaited renaissance, see Mel Marquis & Tadashi Shiraishi, Japanese Cartel Control in Transition, CEU SAN
PABLO MADRID WORKING PAPER NO. 47/2014, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2407825 (also discussing the December 2013 amendments to the Antimonopoly Act); Simon Vande Walle,
Competition and competition law in Japan: between scepticism and embrace, in ASIAN CAPITALISM AND THE
REGULATION OF COMPETITION: TOWARDS A REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW 123
(Michael Dowdle, John Gillespie & Imelda Maher eds., 2013).
35. On Brazil, see Marcelo Calliari & Denis Alves Guimar es, Brazil: Toward a Mature Cartel
Enforcement Jurisdiction?, in COMPETITION LAW IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES 13, 13 (Adrian Emch, Jose
Regazzini & Vassily Rudomino eds., 2012) (“Brazil has experienced a veritable revolution in antitrust
enforcement in the last 10 years, particularly in relation to cartel enforcement”). On South Korea, see Jaemin
Lee, Korea, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 47, 47 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) (while
the KFTC answers to the Korean Prime Minister, the enforcement of competition law based on a consumer
welfare criterion but also encompassing fair trade rules “has become one of the major tasks of the Korean
government and the KFTC has been the vehicle to implement this objective”—which it is doing with notable
verve).
36. See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 4, at 262 (attributing Australia’s influence, like that of Canada, to the
country’s neutrality, independence, eclecticism, and “lack of power”, i.e., the ability to relate to other countries
without necessarily causing them to assume a defensive or suspicious posture, an advantage hegemons often do
not have). For further discussion of Australia, see Deborah Healey, Australia, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMPETITION LAW IN ASIA 344, 344 (Mark Williams ed., 2013) (“Australia has a strong competition law, welldeveloped competition policy and a significant ongoing commitment to markets and competition.”). In early
2014 the Australian Government launched a far-reaching review of national competition laws and policy. See
The Australian Government Competition Policy Review, Competition Policy Review Issues Paper 14 April
2014,
(2014),
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2014/04/Competition_Policy_Review_Issues_Paper.pdf. A final
report is expected in 2015.
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37

1/2003. (Here again one could refer to “co-opetition” among European
competition authorities—both horizontal and vertical, since the Commission is
not free from co-opetitive pressures from “below” despite its central role and
ultimately superior powers.
It therefore seems that, more than ever before, except perhaps in 1962 when
38
the European Commission was endowed with substantial enforcement powers,
competition is breaking out in the global antitrust “space”. The European
Commission and the U.S. agencies remain the market leaders, certainly. As
Sokol says they still “compete for dominance” in relation to “system design and
39
analytical presumptions”, and inevitably they are used as the main examples in
this paper. Nevertheless, there is a growing field of other significant players, and
a general dynamism in the market for market governance.
III. MODES OF COMPETITION
If the global antitrust field is now characterized by oligopolistic competition
with two market leaders, a key question to be explored is: in what arenas, or
through which mechanisms, does global competition take place? In this third part
of the article, we take a tour through these arenas and mechanisms, or to cut
syllables, these “modes” of competition. The tour is not exhaustive, but a sense
of the “multi-market” nature of competition among antitrust enforcers seems to
emerge from a consideration of the modes discussed below.
A. Competing Visions of a Global Framework for Antitrust Law
By the 1990s, one of the big questions being debated was: which vector of
40
governance ought to apply to the enforcement of antitrust? Considering, for
example, that (i) effective policing of internationally active cartels and efficient
merger control often require significant coordination among agencies from
various jurisdictions (the number of which was growing fast, as noted above), or
that (ii) divergence of rules across jurisdictions tends to create externalities, or
that (iii), inconsistent application within one and the same jurisdiction can result

37. For a thumbnail statistical ‘scoreboard’ of how various Member States have performed in the post2004 “modernization” era (taking numbers of envisaged final decisions notified to the Commission as an
indicator), see Wouter Wils, Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003—A Retrospective, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. &
PRAC. 293, 295-296 (2013) (with the “top ten” on this admittedly decontextualized index being France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Hungary; the UK was 12th;
Poland was 15th).
38. See Lorenzo Federico Pace & Katja Seidel, The Drafting and the Role of Regulation 17: A HardFought Compromise, in THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 54 (Kiran Klaus Patel &
Heike Schweitzer eds., 2013), for the story surrounding the adoption of Regulation 17/62.
39. Sokol, supra note 16, at 211.
40. See, e.g., LEON BRITTAN, EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY: KEEPING THE PLAYING-FIELD LEVEL
(1992).
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in discrimination and competitive distortions, was there a need for supranational
institutions? Or was it better to preserve decentralized, sovereignty-based
enforcement? Relatedly: was it desirable to have formal frameworks of
cooperation, or was informal and spontaneous cooperation the better approach?
Sensing a window of opportunity sliding open, then-Competition
Commissioner Leon Brittan in 1992 began to advocate the envelopment of
certain aspects of antitrust enforcement within the structures of what was to
41
become the World Trade Organization, just months after twelve legal experts
led by Wolfgang Fikentscher had begun to give the idea shape in a far-reaching
42
Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC), eventually published in July 1993.
For a while, Commissioner Brittan’s initiative gained some momentum and was
supported by the incoming Competition Commissioner in 1993, Karel van Miert
43
(if not always by DG IV officials). In December 1996, competition law became
a ‘Singapore issue’ (a dubious honor), and in submissions to the WTO’s Working
Group on Trade and Competition Policy, the Commission took the (revised)
position that multilateral WTO rules should be developed to ensure the
prohibition of hard core cartels and to ensure that each WTO Member’s
competition law met common standards of non-discrimination, transparency, and
44
due process.

41. See id. at 53. Following a reallocation of portfolios within the Commission in 1993, Brittan assumed
responsibility for trade matters and became the European Community’s lead negotiator in the Uruguay Round.
42. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO System, 49
AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 281 (1994); Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) in the
Context of International Technological Integration - The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 533 (1996); Daniel Gifford, The Draft International Antitrust Code Proposed at Munich: Good
Intentions Gone Awry, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1997); Eleanor Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for
the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 29-36 (1995); Eleanor Fox,
Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 15-16 (1997). See also Eleanor Fox, A Liberal
Competition Code for the World Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, remarks delivered at the Global Competition
o
Law Conference, Chicago, 28 October 2011 and reported in CONCURRENCES n 1-2013, at point 1 where the
members of the Munich Group understood that political constraints likely precluded the full realization of their
proposals but proceeded deliberately on a normative (de lege ferenda) basis to establish “the best that world
antitrust law and institutions could be.” Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, also among the Munich Group
participants, considered that the DIAC’s substantive rules were too specific and failed to leave room for
national diversity; they prepared an ‘alternative DIAC’ with rules they thought to be less intrusive. See
generally id. (with points 16-52 reproducing and commenting in hindsight on the alternative Code).
43. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, supra note 42, at 9.
44. The drivers behind the EU’s (or at that time the Community’s) attempt to introduce a competition law
discipline within the framework of the WTO included the natural affinity of European officials for
supranational structures with binding rules and legal consequences such as the WTO, particularly given the
analogy between WTO trade liberalization and the Community/Union’s own internal fight against trade
barriers. For the former point, see Matthew Baldwin, EU Trade Politics: Heaven or Hell?, 13 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 926, 933 (2006); on the latter, see Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, supra note 42, at 410; ANESTIS PAPADOPOULOS, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 215-16
(2010). Papadopoulos adds other factors as well, such as the goal of promoting broad convergence through
multilateralism, and that of gaining greater market access abroad for European firms; and, less publicly, a desire
to obviate the extraterritorial application of antitrust law by the U.S. agencies against European companies, and
the possibility of using the Singapore issues as bargaining chips to delay agricultural reform. Id. at 216-219.
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But it was not to be. In speeches beginning in 1996 and becoming more
45
trenchant through 1999, Joel Klein, the then-Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust (AAG), announced his skepticism at the proposal to extend the WTO’s
competences to competition law (i.e., to extend them beyond their current
46
oblique application to antitrust issues ), and this set the stage for a key countermove. In 1997, Klein enlisted an expert advisory committee—the International
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)—to study and recommend to
Klein and to the Attorney General ways of developing desirable forms of global
antitrust governance. In a celebrated report of February 2000, ICPAC stated:
“While recognizing that certain core WTO nondiscrimination principles of
national treatment and transparency would also apply to the enforcement of
domestic competition laws, the ICPAC Report specifically endorsed a more
modest role for the WTO than the establishment of new competition rules subject
47
to WTO dispute settlement.” At the same time, ICPAC unveiled its idea of,
among other things, a new “Global Competition Initiative” consisting of a

45. See Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., A Note of Caution with Respect to
a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy, Address at The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Nov. 18, 1996)
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0998.pdf); Joel I. Klein, A Reality Check on
Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, And a Practical Way Forward on International Antitrust, in
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICIES: EXPLORING THE WAYS
FORWARD 37 (1999).
46. A few scattershot rules in the WTO Agreements address certain matters that are also of concern to
antitrust. For example, under Article VIII GATS, a WTO member is supposed to ensure that monopolies and
exclusive service providers established in its jurisdiction operate consistently with the most favored nation
(MFN) principle, and that they do not abuse their monopoly position in a way that jeopardizes the value of any
specific commitments the member has made. Article IX GATS requires a WTO member to consult upon
request (but the obligation goes no further than this) if another member complains about other anticompetitive
business practices causing harm to it. See PETROS MAVROIDIS & MARK WU, THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION (WTO): DOCUMENTS, CASES AND ANALYSIS, 764 (2nd ed. 2013). See also, e.g., Eleanor M.
Fox & Amadeo Arena, The International Institutions of Competition Law: The Systems’ Norms, in THE DESIGN
OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 444, 452-460 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013);
BRENDAN J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COMPETITION RULES 330, 375-377 (2010); Mitsuo
Matsushita, Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition Policy, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 363 (2004); Brendan Sweeney, Globalisation of Competition Law and Policy: Some Aspects of the
Interface between Trade and Competition, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 375, 401-413 (2004); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann &
Lothar Ehring, WTO Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of the Appellate
Body’s Experience, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1505 (2003); Daniel Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global
Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 478, 489-494 (2000); Mitsuo Matsushita, Competition Law and Policy
in the Context of the WTO System, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1097 (1995). Few are under the delusion that the WTO
agreements establish cohesive rules to ensure that WTO members punish, prevent or even discourage firms
from engaging in most forms of anticompetitive behavior. Outside of the telecommunications sector, where
WTO members can opt in to the terms of a “Reference Paper” and thereby undertake to police the conduct of
major telecoms suppliers (see Eleanor M. Fox, WTO’s First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping
Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271 (2006)), the limited experiments of WTO panels in
solving antitrust problems have generally ended in disappointment. It could hardly be otherwise, given that,
regardless of provisions such as the above-described Article VIII GATS, the WTO has no competence
whatsoever to impose sanctions directly on private actors.
47. Merit E. Janow & James F. Rill, The Origins of the ICN, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK AT TEN 21, 30 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011).
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voluntary network of competition enforcers (and non-governmental advisors but
no trade officials) developing soft instruments and working toward cooperation,
consultation and soft convergence on “process” issues (but not initially on
48
substantive rules ). This was of course the genesis of the International
Competition Network, which has been a powerful magnet, more so than many
might have thought possible when it made its first imagined appearance in the
49
ICPAC report. Meanwhile, the idea of bringing some aspects of competition
48. See Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Committee Final Report, Op. Att’y Gen. 282-285 (2000),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/chapter6.htm [hereinafter ICPAC], where Merit Janow and Jim
Rill, two of the ICPAC members, explain that they had several meetings with U.S. officials, including AAG
Klein, reassuring them that “the objective of the GCI was to provide a consultative forum focusing initially on
process and it was not designed to force substantive harmonization;” see also Janow & Rill, supra note 47, at
37; cf. Monti, supra note 11, at 354, 360. On the other hand, the ICN’s later work has perhaps inevitably crept
into substantive fields and has generated thinly veiled messages to the ICN membership about where their
substantive rules and application thereof should be moving.
49. Obviously, the success of the ICN does not mean it is free of deficiencies. For example, as several
observers have pointed out, the competition authorities of small and developing countries have sometimes
found themselves sidelined in the ICN’s activities and decision-making, while the bigger and more established
players, quite plausibly acting on impulses emanating in part from global commercial interests, set the agenda
or attempt to set it. See Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges
Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1, 46-54 (2009); Fox & Arena, The
International Institutions of Competition Law, supra note 46, at 483 (but also noting at 483 and 485 that the
ICN is accountable to its members); Eleanor M. Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network,
43 INT’L LAW 151, 167-168, 171 (2009) [hereinafter Linked-in]; Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development,
Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 211, 235 (2007); Kathryn McMahon,
Competition Law and Developing Economies: Between “Informed Divergence” and International
Convergence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 209, 233-35 (Ariel Ezrachi
ed., 2012). Asymmetric influence in international organizations—not only because Great Powers and medium
powers can overwhelm and thus tend to inhibit any dissent but also simply because participation has high
relative costs for small countries—is hardly a problem unique to the ICN or competition law. Furthermore,
Sokol points out that some minimal threshold of asymmetric power may be a condition of the ICN’s success, as
it ensures the necessary investment on the part of the U.S. and the EU. See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists
Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. 37, 107 (2007). In that sense, a symbiotic relationship, of sorts, may develop between the powerful
and less powerful members. On the other hand, given the ICN’s voluntary nature, the possibility of a
widespread feeling of lack of “ownership” among its members bears risks, as reflected in the discourse of the
th
ICN’s leadership. See, e.g., Andreas Mundt, The ICN’s 12 Birthday—What’s New?, COMPETITION POL’Y
INT’L (October 2013), at 3 (“focus and inclusiveness will remain indispensable elements of our path forward”)
(emphasis added). For the likely reasons why the ICN has been rapidly accepted by the global community of
antitrust enforcers (save the authorities established in China, which I surmise may be seeking (i) to consolidate
their standing, while making the political point that China can resist international norms if it so wishes, leaving
themselves the option (ii) to join the ICN later in a position of increased strength and prestige, and thus possibly
greater “bargaining power”, even if entry is formally free with nothing to bargain about), see Sokol, supra at
105, 116, 121-22; D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055
(2010). For further reflections on the ICN, see, among others, Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The
International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS 51 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011); Hollman et al.,
supra note 30, at 92; BUDZINSKI, supra note 10, at 142-47; Yane Svetiev, The Limits of Informal International
Law: Enforcement, Norm-generation, and Learning in the ICN, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
271 (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, eds., 2012); Marie-Laure Djelic, International
Competition Network, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATIONS 80
(Thomas Hale & David Held eds., 2011); Marie-Laure Djelic & Thibaut Kleiner, The International Competition
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law firmly under the wing of trade law was rejected in the fall of 2003 in Cancún
50
amidst Doha Round talks. It has not been revived, and it is hard to imagine a
change in the wind in the coming years. A multilateral trade deal agreed in Bali
in December 2013 is of little moment. That agreement may come as a relief from
a trade perspective, having spared multilateralism in trade from an ignominious
demise; but on the whole it is unambitious and does not address cross-border
51
competition law issues. There is simply no political momentum at present for
the development of a WTO-level competition law initiative of a scope
52
comparable to those contemplated in the discussions from 1996 to 2003.
With the WTO relegated to the background as far as competition issues are
concerned, the ICN is riding a wave of popularity and good will. It has been
described as not just successful but dramatically successful and it continues to
53
perform important roles. Unavoidably, the organization puts further strain on
Network: Moving Towards Transnational Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL
DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 287 (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2008). See also MarieLaure Djelic & Sigrid Quack, Overcoming Path Dependency: Path Generation in Open Systems, 36 THEORY &
SOC’Y 161, 177-79 (2007).
50. Among many others, see Josef Drexl, International Competition Policy after Cancún: Placing a
Singapore Issue on the WTO Development Agenda, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 419 (2004); Taimoon Stewart,
The Fate of Competition Policy in Cancun: Politics or Substance?, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 7
(2004); Andrew Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 303 (2004); Aditya
Bhattacharjea, The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country
Perspective, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 293 (2006); Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False
Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383 (2007); Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 154-57; PAPADOPOULOS,
supra note 44, at 225-42; Alberto Heimler, Competition Policy as a Tool of EU Foreign Policy:
Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Soft Convergence, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
ASSESSING EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD 82 (Federiga Bindi ed., 2010); GERBER, supra note 4, at 101-07;
EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 1246-47 (2011).
51. See Bridges Daily Update # 5: Historic Bali Deal to Spring WTO, Global Economy Ahead, ICTSD
(December 7, 2013), http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto-mc9-bali-2013/bridges-daily-updates-bali-2013/180991/.
52. The ultimate effects of future preferential trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership are difficult to predict; most likely, such PTAs bode ill for multilateralism in general
(though it is not entirely inconceivable that they could prompt key developing countries to engage more
seriously with multilateral initiatives). This is not to suggest that there is no pending discussion of a return to the
WTO as a forum for developing some kind of system to deal with issues of international competition law. For
example, it is argued that a functioning competitive order on a worldwide basis is a global public good and that,
given the limits of other global solutions (soft law, soft convergence and extraterritorial application of domestic
laws), the WTO seems to be a logical forum in which to hammer out such competition law disciplines. See
Lúcio Tomé Féteira, Right to Development and International Transfer of Technology: a Competition Law
Perspective, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES TO REGULATION 91 (Mario Viola de
Azevedo Cunha, Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Lucas Lixinski & Lúcio Tomé Féteira eds., 2013). In the
latter essay, Tomé Féteira carries forward Josef Drexl’s proposal of a new perspective in which the protection of
competition in its global dimension assumes a “quasi-constitutional character” in the WTO system. See Drexl,
supra note 50, at 456. As discussed infra note 58, and in light of the political climate alluded to here in the main
text, the WTO may conceivably prove relevant for initiatives drawn more narrowly than the proposals that were
on the table in the run-up to Cancún.
53. Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 173; Fox describes the ICN as a success when judged by its own
organizational mission and as a success relative to other international organizations. See id. at 165-66. In
another essay she emphasizes the subsidiarity principle as a key factor behind this success. See Eleanor M. Fox,
Antitrust without Borders: From Roots to Codes to Networks, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION
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54

the resources of smaller authorities. But it has clearly not been made redundant
by (nor has it made redundant) the host of crisscrossing policy networks engaged
in some of the same activities, like those organized under the aegis of the OECD
55
or UNCTAD, or those meeting in newer fora such as, e.g., the African
56
Competition Forum. As time goes on, however, the limitations and latent
57
tensions of the ICN may lead to a collective and parallel search for solutions to
POLICY 265 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Antitrust without Borders]. Her references to
subsidiarity are not accidental, as subsidiarity can operate not only as a decentralizing force but as a justification
for centralized solutions, depending on the particular problems requiring a response and the distribution of
capacities within a given system (in this case the international system of competition law jurisdiction).
54. Agencies that belong to both the ICN and other competition policy networks participate to varying
degrees in these organizations if they have, despite tight budgets, the money and personnel to do so. Although
financial aid is sometimes generated by ICN fundraising activities, smaller agencies are nonetheless typically
faced with resource dilemmas and must sometimes choose between investing in one forum or another. On the
phenomenon of ‘overlapping networks’, see Maher & Papadopoulos, supra note 29, at 84-6. See also Dan
Sjöblom & Monica Widegren, ICN Membership—Opportunities and Challenges for a Competition Authority, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN 21 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011) (discussing the resource
dilemmas of the Swedish authority, as it is granted no additional funds or personnel by the government for its
ICN work; and as the attention the authority gives to the ICN must compete with its other activities).
55. As the theme of this essay is competition, one might note that in some senses the ICN, as a new
entrant (or, with respect to some activities, as a potential entrant), has put a bit of pressure on the OECD and on
UNCTAD to continue to innovate and supply high quality services. Cf. Fox, Antitrust without Borders, supra
note 53, at 273; Fox, Linked-in, supra note 49, at 166 n.46. On the other hand, Jenny stresses the
complementarities of the ICN and the OECD Competition Committee, and explains that: “The overlap between
the two institutions is minimal (some may be found in the area of technical assistance) even when the two
organizations take up issues that seem similar.” Frederic Jenny, The International Competition Network and the
OECD Competition Committee: Differences, Similarities and Complementarities, in THE INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN 93, 104 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011).
56. The inaugural meeting of the African Competition Forum convened in Nairobi on 3 March 2011.
Delegates from 19 African countries participated, together with representatives of several international
organizations and other guests. The introductory speech on that occasion by Uhuru Kenyatta, at that time
Kenya’s Minister of Finance (and today a highly controversial figure), is posted on YouTube. Uhuru Kenyatta
launching The African Competition Forum, YouTube (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=UX7LtqGA__w (linking competition policy in Africa to allocative efficiency, consumer welfare and
the de-concentration of economic power to promote an economic equivalent of political democracy). As Maher
and Papadopoulos explain, the African Competition Forum is “expected to be the basis for the development of
agency capacity in the region and to promote awareness and appreciation of competition principles among
government officials and other market participants. It will facilitate interactions between African competition
agencies, enabling them to share experiences, expertise and knowledge. The scheme may, in the long term, lead
to the harmonization of competition laws of the participating countries.” Maher & Papadopoulos, supra note 29,
at 83-4. The activities of the Forum are described, and informative newsletters are available, on a dedicated
website: see African Competition Forum, http://www.africancompetitionforum.org/ (last accessed February 7,
2015).
57. Given the inescapable heterogeneity among the ICN’s members, it has been suggested at least with
regard to some areas of the law that working toward “superior practices,” and the implicit expectation that ICN
members can and will conform as far as possible to them, is an inappropriate basis for the ICN system. On this
view, it would be better if the goal pursued in the ICN were simply for its members to (better) understand each
other’s laws. See Monti, supra note 11, at 345. If this more modest aim were adopted, the term “informed
divergence” would acquire its more natural meaning, as opposed to its current significance (see supra notes 1516 and accompanying text) as a kind of pressure valve that moderates the pace of and to some extent
“legitimates” a broader convergence process. On overcoming obstacles of selectivity and bias in communication
between different social groups, such as lawyers and economists but more generally between actors who
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problems that cannot be addressed in an ICN context, in particular due to some of
its defining features – no de jure power whatsoever, and a fundamentally modest
albeit elastic mandate. It should not be ruled out that, despite the retreat from the
WTO at Cancún and the prevailing wisdom that competition is to be kept out of
that more formal environment, a cautious new impetus might arise in the coming
years, leading to the launch of certain issue-specific initiatives that could
58
generate (possibly plurilateral) WTO rules in a circumscribed field. In such a
disagree, see Akihiko Nakagawa, Toward a Dialogistic Competition Policy, 20 HOKKAIDO J. NEW GLOBAL L.
& POL’Y 171 (2013).
58. To cite just one example, there are the bitter experiences developing countries have had being
exploited by export cartels. The term “export cartels” in this context excludes exporters colluding on the direct
or delegated instructions of a government, since the latter may constitute a measure subject to challenge under
Article XI:1 GATT, as experience in the raw materials sector shows; the reference is thus limited to export
cartels falling outside of that provision. Many scholars have written about the virtues and vices of export cartels,
including recently Ariel Ezrachi, Domestic and Cross-Border Transfer of Wealth, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 199 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013). Not all export cartels are pernicious; but some have been
compared to hazardous waste, and here there is a troubling international regulatory gap. Externalities imposed
on developing countries – in particular, those lacking the capacity for credible extraterritorial law enforcement –
can result in exorbitant wealth transfers in favor of foreign price-fixers, transfers likely exacerbated in the age of
severe penalties for cartelists that get caught in developed jurisdictions (since credible sanctions tend to
encourage “trade diversion” in illegal conduct where there is sufficient capital mobility). Certain WTO
provisions, including for example Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
could conceivably be interpreted in a manner that disciplines export cartels in a few countries, including large
ones. See D. Daniel Sokol, What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate
Solution?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 967, 977-78 (2008). Article 11:3 of the Agreement on Safeguards
could potentially be invoked to challenge explicit exemptions for export cartels, such as those provided for in
U.S. law. But it is almost inconceivable that Article 11:3 could be applied against the more common forms of
implicit exemption, such as one finds under EU law – which arise de facto from the Westphalian tradition that
states do not normally regulate (mis)conduct with purely foreign consequences (i.e., where the “effects test”
fails). Cf. ROLAND WEINRAUCH, COMPETITION LAW IN THE WTO: THE RATIONALE FOR A FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT 147 (2004) (“For example, [the question of] whether the mere non-enforcement of competition
law against import cartels falls within the scope of [Article 11:3] is highly doubtful.”). And if implicit
exemptions or non-enforcement cannot be challenged under Article 11:3, then even a successful challenge of an
explicit exemption does not really remove the possibility for the defendant WTO member to maintain an
exemption. Furthermore, since non-violation complaints at the WTO constitute a notoriously weak discipline, it
must be concluded that the current ensemble of WTO provisions is inadequate to address the export cartel
problem. Particularly in the developing world – i.e., where many countries opposed and derailed a WTO-level
competition law regime – there have been calls for an issue-specific WTO-level solution involving new
provisions, or for the development of a joint solution by the WTO and UNCTAD. According to one approach, a
high-level commission could be appointed to study and define the problem and focus objectives, following
which it would prepare an initial draft of a multilateral agreement for further consideration. (See CUTS,
Contribution to the UNCTAD Roundtable on Cross-border anticompetitive practices: The challenges for
developing countries and economies in transition (2012), available at http://www.cuts-international.
org/pdf/CUTS_contribution_at_UNCTAD-IGE_2012.pdf, at 6.) Sokol has advanced a more defined approach,
suggesting an enforceable WTO obligation of notification and transparency, with clearance procedures for
“legitimate export joint ventures” in home jurisdictions that would beneficially raise the cost of cross-border
predatory collusion. It appears that other pure export cartels (it is not entirely clear which ones) would be bereft
of any antitrust immunity. See Sokol, supra at 980-982. Solutions such as this seem fit for further consideration.
However, not everyone accepts that a global solution is necessary to combat export cartels. See CRANE, supra
note 17, at 231 (taking the view – questionable, to my mind – that extraterritoriality and bilateral trade
agreements can adequately address the problem). For further examples of leftover issues from the years of
trade-and-competition discussions that seem, in the main, insoluble in the framework of the ICN, see, e.g., Fox,
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scenario, and depending on the enterprise taken up, it may be expected that
certain industrial interests in the developed world would mobilize against and
seek to sabotage, or seek at least to persuade governments to water down, any
59
such rules. A strong effort should therefore be devoted to stimulating a cultural
change, reinforced if necessary by quid pro quos to alter the incentives of
60
developed countries.
Further digressions about the ICN’s nature, work and capabilities could be
added. But to return to the central theme, one perceives – in the episode
61
described above regarding the emergence of the ICN – a contest between two
models, each championed by a different jurisdiction. They were not just two
models that happened to “be there.” The search for and development of a new
global initiative was really a search for an American global initiative, and a
strategic response to Europe’s attempt to promote supranationalist governance in
62
international antitrust. The choice of the ICN as the leading framework for
global cooperation in this field has been quite a coup for the U.S. DOJ, even
63
though DG Comp itself was ambivalent about DG Trade’s WTO gambit, and
even though all the EU Competition Commissioners from Mario Monti and
Neelie Kroes to Joaquín Almunia and now Margrethe Vestager have fully
64
supported the ICN’s activities. At the same time, the ICN’s broad appeal has
Linked-In, supra note 49, at 168 and 173. In addition to export cartels, Fox refers to the adverse effects of
antidumping used as a trade remedy, market access impediments, the use of state authority to immunize private
conduct from antitrust attack, and more generally, issues at the intersection between competition law and trade
law (whereas the ICN is supposed to be all antitrust all the time, a formula meant to exclude trade matters). See
also Fox, Antitrust without Borders, supra note 53; Fox, Fingleton and Mitchell, The past and future of
international antitrust, supra note 15; Brendan Sweeney, Global Competition: Searching for a Rational Basis
for Global Competition Rules, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 209, 219-226, 243-244 (2008), with references; Brendan
Sweeney, International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 58, 6162, 69 (2009); SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 399-401 (and chapter 9 generally).
59. Cf. Bradford, Preference for Nonbinding Regimes, supra note 18, at 327 (“The United States would
also likely oppose rules banning export cartels [ . . . ]”). Sokol recalls the strident objections of the U.S
Department of Commerce (reflecting those of certain private interests) to any attempt to curtail the WebbPomerene Act during the Antitrust Modernization Commission hearings. See Sokol, supra note 58, at 975 n.42.
60. See Sokol, supra note 58, at 981 (“To provide an incentive for [exporting countries] to agree to the
WTO solution, developing world countries would need to provide increased market access in other areas.”);
Bernard Hoekman & Kamal Saggi, Tariff Bindings and Bilateral Cooperation on Export Cartels, 83 J.
DEVELOPMENT ECON. 141 (2007) (showing that ceteris paribus a developing country could offer greater market
access through tariff reductions but recognizing that tariff bindings required by trade agreements already in
force constrain this possibility, effectively raising the “price” of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary quid pro quo).
61. The above version of events is quite abbreviated. For a fuller analytical discussion of the rise of the
ICN, see generally THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN (Paul Lugard ed., 2011).
62. See BUDZINSKI, supra note 10, at 7143. But Cf. GERBER, supra note 4, at 111 (explaining that the ICN
launch “had the strategic effect of further undermining support for a multilateral competition law project”) and
at 115 (explaining that some interpreted ICPAC’s hearings in Washington, D.C. “as a means of reasserting
[U.S.] control of the agenda of transnational competition law development”).
63. See PAPADOPOULOS supra note 44, at 243-45. Furthermore, DG Trade’s support for the WTO option
sat awkwardly next to the opposition of significant business interests, as expressed by UNICE in position
papers. See id. at 214-15.
64. See id. at 243; Ehlermann, supra note 25, at 326.
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furnished scholars focusing on Slaughter’s “new world order” and related ideas
with a useful case study of transnational network governance and communities of
65
interest.
The question of whose preferred model prevailed is however of little
importance for our purposes. What seems significant is the emergence in the
1990s of two competing and possibly incompatible visions of global
66
governance, arguably reflecting the anxiety of a former hegemon about its
influence and leadership role being diverted to its chief rival. One might perhaps
say something similar about the Commission’s full self-immersion in the ICN: to
ignore it would have assured American dominance in an emerging, high-stakes
sector.
B. Bilateral Relationships
67

In the field of antitrust, and to oversimplify a bit, bilateral relationships are
established in two main ways: (i) by concluding a bilateral cooperation
agreement (“BCA”), nearly always with non-binding terms and no dispute
resolution mechanism (amounting de facto to “soft” commitments from the
68
perspective of international law ), or its cousin, a Memorandum of
69
Understanding (“MOU”, signed at the agency level), or (ii) by concluding a
65. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J.
INT’L L. 113, 114-20 (2009); Svetiev, supra note 49, at 271-75. For an early exposition of network governance
as a response to the “globalization paradox”, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 183 (Sept.-Oct. 1997).
66. Informal networks can undoubtedly operate side by side with formal institutions and binding
multilateral rules. When a WTO framework agreement on competition law issues was being discussed, the
European Commission considered that the ICN could function as a complement to what would have been the
relevant WTO disciplines. See FIONA MARSHALL, COMPETITION REGULATION AND POLICY AT THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANISATION 147 (2010). Nevertheless, one may argue that reliance on the ICN as a central
competition agency network and reliance on the WTO as a dispute resolution forum spring from quite different
philosophies about antitrust sovereignty, and it may be argued furthermore that the full expression of the ICN
concept as we know it and the formal incursion of the WTO into the antitrust field would at the very least pose
some mutual tension. Hypothetically speaking, if a broadly framed WTO agreement on competition law were
adopted, the ICN’s role and functioning would likely have to be redefined to some extent.
67. For a more taxonomical discussion, see Valerie Desmedts, International Competition Law
Enforcement: Different Means, One Goal?, 8 COMPETITION L. REV. 223, 237-49 (2012).
68. See Mitsuo Matsushita, International Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Policy, 1
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 463, 468-9 (2002).
69. ”First generation” BCAs have been concluded on the basis of somewhat diverse legal authority
depending on the jurisdiction concerned. For example, in the U.S., such agreements have taken the form of
executive agreements; therefore, in the absence of ratification by the U.S. Senate they do not constitute
international treaties. By contrast, so far as the European Commission is concerned and with respect to
agreements reached with third countries (but not agreements of lesser stature, i.e., so-called “administrative
arrangements”), jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice requires the intervention of the EU legislator,
which first authorizes the Commission to negotiate the terms and later ‘concludes’ the agreement, thereby
making it definitively valid under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The 1991 cooperation
agreement with the United States thus had to be approved by a joint decision of the Council and the
Commission in 1995. See Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. I-3641, ¶ 43 (Commission
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trade agreement with competition provisions (“TACP”), whose terms create
international obligations but whose competition chapters may be either binding
70
or, not uncommonly, merely discretionary. In addition, with or without such
agreements in place, agencies frequently engage in regular or ad hoc informal
71
cooperation within the bounds of their legal capacities. Informal cooperation of
this kind may follow the general contours of more formal agreements while
avoiding their less expedient provisions, and it is also often inspired by or based
on the Recommendation of the OECD Council on international enforcement
72
73
cooperation or based on other instruments such as Best Practices documents.
The observed popularity of “soft” commitments worldwide in the cooperative
competition-related frameworks just described is the flipside of the story
recounted above in relation to the failed WTO framework agreement, which
would have entailed binding obligations and dispute settlement procedures.
Particularly in an environment of uncertainty, the softer the obligation, the lower
the risk of entering into a cooperative arrangement (and of unintended

lacked competence to conclude agreements with third countries). That does not mean, of course, that the mutual
promises in the U.S./EU agreement are binding; to the contrary, the provisions are designed deliberately to
avoid non-discretionary obligations and any kind of binding dispute settlement. As for the enhanced
commitments undertaken in “second generation” BCAs (see infra section B.1), such an agreement must be
authorized ex ante by legislation or ex post by ratification, or both.
70. For example, in the free trade agreements concluded by the U.S. with other countries (mostly on a
bilateral basis with the exception of NAFTA and, looking ahead, the Trans-Pacific Partnership), there are
generally enforcement cooperation provisions but these are “soft,” non-binding terms within a broader “hard
law” instrument. By contrast, some competition-related terms—in particular, those relating to stateowned/controlled enterprises or privileged monopolies—embody firmer commitments, and dispute settlement
may be invoked by either contracting party. For more detail and nuance regarding forms of bilateral
cooperation, see generally COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011);
PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 52-92. For a detailed examination of the “soft” competition chapters in
preferential trade agreements with a focus on Latin America, see D. Daniel Sokol, Order without (Enforceable)
Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231 (2008) (underlining the contrast between the non-enforceable competition provisions
and the harder commitments covering other areas pertaining to trade policy in the same agreements).
71. The most important legal limitation concerns the exchange of confidential information, a delicate
matter both legally and politically, not least because powerful business interests tend actively to oppose the
development of lawful mechanisms by which such information may be shared. In the absence of authorized
sharing, agencies can however exchange not just public information but also “agency confidential” information,
i.e., information generated internally regarding issues such as market definition, theories of harm or corrective
remedies, or information, prior to any public announcement, concerning the fact that an agency is investigating
a particular firm or group of firms. On the exchange of agency confidential information, see, e.g., Thomas
Deisenhofer, International Cooperation in Merger Cases—An EU Practitioner’s Perspective, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2010: MERGER CONTROL IN EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 227 (Philip
Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2013).
72. Organization on Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the OECD Council
concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings (September 16, 2014),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2014-rec-internat-coop-competition.pdf. For background
leading up to the influential 1995 version of the OECD Council’s Recommendation, see, e.g., BRUNO
ZANETTIN, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 56 (2002).
73. See, e.g., Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/mergers/legislation/best_practices_2011_en.pdf (Oct. 14, 2011).
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consequences with costly exit, if any); and possibly the greater the capacity of the
parties to bypass lawmaking formalities that might end in deadlock (which also
74
implies a correspondingly weaker base of legitimacy for the softer solutions).
1. Bilateral Cooperation Agreements
With regard to the first category, after the U.S. had already been party to
BCAs with Canada, Germany, and Australia since 1959, 1976 and 1982
respectively, the U.S. and the European Community in 1991 concluded a well75
known BCA which included inter alia positive comity provisions and which has
served as a template for many of the BCAs that followed in the next two
76
decades. The EU has subsequently concluded similar agreements with Canada
77
in 1999, Japan in 2003, and South Korea in 2009. The U.S., which has a strong
78
proclivity for bilateral agreements as a matter of foreign policy, struck
79
agreements with Canada in 1995, then with Brazil, Israel and Japan in 1999
(together with a second-generation BCA with Australia the same year—see
80
81
below), Mexico in 2000, and with Chile’s competition authority in 2011.

74. Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Remarks (panel on “A Hard Look at Soft Law”), 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 373, 377 (1991). See also, among others, Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423, 434-450 (2000) (discussing how soft law permits parties to
calibrate lower levels of obligation, precision and/or delegation, and giving examples of different permutations);
Sokol, supra note 16, at 196-7.
75. The U.S. also entered into specific positive comity agreements with the EU in 1998 and with Canada
in 2004. The provisions of these agreements have never been formally employed, although some informal
positive comity requests have been made, to little effect. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at iv, vii ,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/1c.pdf.
76. In brief, the 1991 agreement provided for mutual notification of relevant cases; coordinated
investigations (with the aid, in particular in cases involving merger control or in cartel cases where a leniency
application has been made, of waivers of confidentiality by key parties to permit the sharing of sensitive
information); continual dialogue on a wide range of matters; traditional comity (basically, abstention out of
respect for the important interests of a foreign jurisdiction); and positive comity (i.e., the possibility to request a
foreign jurisdiction to act against conduct harming the important interests of the requesting jurisdiction). Id.
77. DG Competition also has MOUs with the competition authorities of Brazil (2009), Russia (2011),
China (2012), and India (2013). An earlier MOU with South Korea (2004) foresaw and then ripened into a more
formal BCA. A similar upgrade could conceivably take place with the Chinese authorities in 2015 when the
MOU comes up for review. See European Commission signs Memorandum of Understanding with the
Competition Commission of India, EU COMPETITION & REGULATORY (Slaughter and May, London, Eng.), Nov.
22, 2013, available at http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2038182/eu-competition-and-regulatorynewsletter-22-nov-28-nov-2013.pdf.
78. See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Ann-Marie Slaughter & Duncan
Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000).
79. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 75 at vii.
80. Agreement Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, U.S.-Mex., July 11, 2000, T.I.A.S.,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/policy/cooperation-agreements/us-mexico-agreement-regarding-applicationtheir-competition-laws.
81. Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation Between the United States Department of Justice and the United
States Federal Trade Commission, of the one part, and the Fiscalia Nacional Economica of Chile, on the other
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These agreements apply in addition to those with Germany and Australia, which
82
remain in place.
Several authorities have suggested that the various “first generation” BCAs
have been of limited value, for example because they do not provide for the
exchange of confidential information absent the consent of relevant parties, or
83
because positive comity has never gained any traction in practice. Without
denying the limitations of first generation agreements, one may also posit that the
negotiation and use of such agreements has created real value for the jurisdictions
concerned to the extent that it has enabled agencies to build a communicative
infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, develop trust, and exchange
84
expertise. A related point is that an implicit and less visible benefit, which was
also an important driver of the earliest agreements but which today appears to be
taken for granted, may be the avoidance or management of tension due to the
85
actual or potential extraterritorial enforcement of competition laws.

part, U.S.-Chile, Mar. 31, 2011, T.I.A.S. 11-331, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/
international-antitrust-and-consumer-protection-cooperation-agreements/110331us-chile-agree.pdf.
82. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at iv. Like the EU, the U.S. agencies have also concluded a few
MOUs with competition authorities of other countries, specifically those of Russia (1999), China (2011), and
India (2012). International Competition and Consumer Protection Cooperation Agreements. F.T.C. (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/international-cooperation-agreements.
83. See, e.g., ICPAC, supra note 48, at xiii-xiv (“[I]n many respects, at present the bilateral agreements
still remain limited instruments. Because they do not alter existing law or otherwise expand the powers of
antitrust authorities, they do not expand the possibilities for the sharing of confidential or privileged information
without the provider’s consent [. . .]. They may not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes that continue
after the end of consultations. Further, the agreements do not implicate substantive law nor seek to reach any
formal procedural harmonization between the signatory jurisdictions.”). For discussion of the non-impact of
positive comity, see, e.g., Philip Marsden, The Curious Incident of Positive Comity—The Dog that Didn’t Bark
(And the Trade Dogs that Just Might Bite), in COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 301 (Andrew
Guzman ed., 2011).
84. In the workshop on which this contribution is based, I suggested that some first-generation
cooperation agreements (including MOUs) might in this sense be regarded as “seeding” agreements potentially
preparing the ground for bolder steps. A similar perspective is put forward by Brendan Sweeney, who refers
more specifically to positive comity: “Perhaps the greatest benefit of positive comity will be its intangible
benefits, those that arise from the fact that states have agreed to communicate their competition concerns to one
another. If this dialogue produces greater understanding, greater levels of trust and confidence and perhaps
greater convergence, it will have served a useful purpose.” SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 297. See also Randolph
Tritell & Elizabeth Krause, The Federal Trade Commission’s International Antitrust Program, Presentation at
st
the ABA’s 61 Annual Antitrust Law Spring Meeting in Washington, April 11, 2013, at 4 (“In addition to
providing a legal framework for cooperation, the agreements have been catalysts to facilitate closer working
relationships.”). Of course, two agencies can also develop trust and coordinated communication or working
methods in the absence of any agreement. From this point of view, a first-generation agreement might be
regarded by the agencies concerned as being superfluous; the same consideration would not apply, however,
with respect to second-generation agreements (see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text), for which even
systematic informal cooperation cannot substitute. Cf. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 80-1.
85. See Tritell & Krause, supra note 84, at 4 (“While the first agreements were motivated primarily by a
desire to reduce and manage conflicts that arise from extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws, modern
agreements seek mainly to enhance enforcement cooperation.”). Conflicts have of course arisen, and have fed
media frenzies, but overall what seems more remarkable is the absence of conflicts that boil over. The potential
for conflict may however depend on various factors including among others the substantive field of law,
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While it remains to be seen whether positive comity will ever come of age
(which may depend on the jurisdiction pairs concerned), the obstacles to
cooperation resulting from the confidentiality obligations imposed on
competition agencies are in some limited measure addressed by other
instruments, at least as concerns certain jurisdictions. In the first place, a country
that has criminalized cartel conduct, e.g., the U.S., can employ the procedures
provided for in (non-antitrust-specific) mutual legal assistance treaties, or
“MLATs,” to obtain confidential information (and to cooperate in other relevant
ways, such as by collecting evidence) if it has concluded an MLAT with another
86
country, e.g., Canada. However, a legal gap may remain in scenarios involving
two countries X and Y where X seeks the transmission of confidential
information by authorities in country Y but either Y has not criminalized cartels
or it has done so but there is no MLAT or equivalent agreement between the two
87
countries. The constraints that limit the exchange of confidential information in
the absence of an MLAT—which describes the vast majority of country
combinations X and Y—have become increasingly acute, as anticompetitive
behavior with multi-jurisdictional effects are nowadays a pervasive characteristic
of the globalized economy.
The response of certain jurisdictions to confidentiality constraints and to the
frequent need for access to evidence located abroad has been to turn to “second
generation” agreements, which embody enhanced commitments in hard law
instruments (i.e., treaties agreed on the basis of enabling acts) and which thus
take the original BCAs a significant step further. These agreements are
heterogeneous but among their key common elements are provisions authorizing
the exchange of confidential information between competition authorities without
need for any waiver from the party or parties concerned—generally subject to
restrictions intended to preserve the rights of defense, to limit disclosure of
business secrets, personal data and leniency materials, and to ensure that the use
of evidence in the requesting jurisdiction does not exceed the powers of the
transmitting agency. For example, in the second-generation BCA signed in May
2013 between the EU and Switzerland, the requesting party (in particular,
Switzerland) is barred from using information received from the EU via the
geographic overlap, frequency of interaction and the magnitude of the commercial stakes, which may have
political economy implications.
86. Technically, the 1990 MLAT between the U.S. and Canada, which has been used several times (in
addition to their 1995 and 2004 comity agreements), does not require that the underlying conduct be of a
criminal nature in the country receiving the request (a feature which is not common to all the MLATS that the
U.S. has concluded). However, requests between these countries are evaluated case-by-case and limitations are
imposed on the use to which the transmitted information may be put. At least in the realm of antitrust, since
requests between the U.S. and Canada are made essentially in relation to horizontal cartels, which are criminally
illegal in both countries, the absence of a dual criminality requirement is academic.
87. For further details on MLATs, see, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST COOPERATION GUIDE (2004). More recently, see SWEENEY, supra note 46, at 314-17; OECD,
Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, OECD Document DAF/COMF/GF 29-30, 26771 (2012).
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treaty mechanism as evidence to put individuals in prison. Another second89
generation agreement has been negotiated between the EU and Canada.
Australia concluded a second-generation agreement already in 1999 with the
U.S., and in 2007 concluded another one with New Zealand (with an additional
Austalia-New Zealand inter-agency agreement concluded in 2013). In the case of
the U.S., despite its agreement with Australia, the underlying enabling legislation
is problematic in that it appears to require foreign treaty partners to allow the use
of shared information for purposes beyond the competition matter animating the
request of the U.S. enforcer, which would present a legal-political obstacle in
90
many jurisdictions. No country but Australia, which has its own enabling
91
legislation in place, has ventured to negotiate with the U.S. an agreement of the
same intensity. Finally, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway in 2001 concluded a
second-generation trilateral cooperation agreement, made quadrilateral when
Sweden joined the group in 2003.
2. Trade Agreements with Competition Provisions
In addition to bilateral agreements that specifically concern cooperation in
the enforcement of competition law, bilateral trade agreements with competition
law provisions or chapters are another means of pursuing a range of related
92
objectives. Trade agreements with competition provisions (TACPs) are
noteworthy because, among other reasons, they constitute a significant

88. Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation on the
Application of their Competition Laws, May 17, 2013. For the relevant and understandably elaborate provisions
on the exchange of confidential information, see id. at art. 7(4) to art. 10. Further details are discussed in Patrik
Ducrey, The Agreement between Switzerland and the EU Concerning Cooperation in the Application of their
Competition Laws, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 437 (2013); David Mamane & Samuel Jost, Let’s
work together—An EU/Swiss co-operation agreement has far-reaching implications, COMPETITION LAW
INSIGHT 8 (13 November 2012).
89. See European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission Report on
Competition Policy 2012 15 (SWD (2013) 159 final, 2013).
90. The relevant legislation is the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (‘IAEAA’)
15 U.S. §§ 6201-6212 (1994). See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 39-40 (April 2007) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_
recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (calling on the U.S. Congress to clarify that the IAEAA does not in fact
require that treaty provisions must permit the U.S. authorities to use transmitted information for noncompetition purposes), cited in Edward Swaine, Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy: United States, in
COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 19 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011).
91. The relevant Australian laws are the Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 and the
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. In addition, Section 15AAA of the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 enables the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to share confidential
information with foreign agencies even where no intergovernmental or inter-agency agreement has been
concluded. For details regarding Australia’s relatively progressive regime, see Marek Martyniszyn, InterAgency Evidence Sharing in Competition Law Enforcement, 19 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 11 (2015).
92. See PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 93-144.
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instrument of the EU’s external relations policy. The number of such trade
agreements has grown significantly in the last 20 years, and the EU has been one
of their prominent promoters, originally in the wake of the Soviet Republic’s
disintegration and then, in the last decade, as a hedge against the remote odds of
94
WTO members reaching consensus in the Doha Development Round.
With the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2010), the trilateral EUColumbia-Peru Free Trade Agreement (2011), and the pending trade and
95
investment agreement between the EU and Canada, the number of bilateral (or
trilateral) TACPs to which the EU is a party is now around 30. In general, the
U.S. seems to have been less concerned with concluding TACPs, although there
are such agreements in force between the U.S. and Singapore (2004), Australia
96
(2005), Peru (2006) and South Korea (2007). Furthermore, the form of the EU’s
TACPs often goes beyond traditional free trade measures, and extends to a wide
range of integration measures and other fields, particularly in the case of
“association agreements” (AAs) and “stabilization and association agreements”
(SAAs). In part this is explained by the fact that the agreements can serve as a
pre-condition for joining the restricted club of EU Member States, but the EU
also concludes broad agreements with countries that have little or no hope or
desire to accede. Papadopoulos assigns the EU’s bilateral trade agreements to
three categories: (i) those with candidate or potential candidate countries; (ii)
those with countries participating in the European Neighborhood Policy (i.e.,
Euro-Med countries and countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia); and (iii)
those with selected trade partners, in particular Mexico (1997), Chile (2002),

93. See, e.g., Umut Aydin, Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order,
34 J. EURO. INTEGRATION 663 (2012) (discussing the bureaucratic self-interest of DG Competition in seeking to
extend – by way of trade agreements and other forms of agreements – the global reach of the EU competition
law model).
94. Cf. Blanca Rodriguez-Galindo, Head of International Relations Unit at the European Commission on
Competition and Development, Presentation at ICN Conference, Moscow (May 29, 2007) (available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?page=37). (“Given that competition matters are
off the agenda of the multilateral negotiations for now, we would try to move on competition issues bilaterally
in the context of the new generation of market-access driven Free Trade Agreements . . . .”).
95. The title of the EU-Canada agreement—the COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT
(CETA)—reflects the extent of its ambitions. Negotiations on the CETA were concluded on September 26,
2014, and the Agreement is subject to formal approval procedures on both sides. Further details are available at
the European Commission’s Trade website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
canada/ (last accessed February 7, 2015).
96. If negotiations ultimately bear fruit, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
between the U.S. and the EU will contain competition provisions and their intensity remains to be seen. One
may also mention the sector-specific Open Skies agreement between these jurisdictions, which in Annex 2
contains specific cooperation provisions with regard to competition, administered by the Open Skies Joint
Commission (with representatives of the European Commission and of the U.S. Department of Transportation).
No provision is made for the exchange of confidential information. Joint work has been produced, however. See
EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE
ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES (November 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/joint_alliance_report.pdf.
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South Africa (1999), now joined by the above-mentioned agreements with Korea,
Columbia-Peru, and Canada (with still other agreements under negotiation).
The various agreements are heterogeneous not just across those categories
but within the categories as well. The taxonomy will not be pursued further here
in any detail, but some general observations can be made. One is the simple point
that competition law is never neglected when the EU concludes bilateral (or
trilateral) trade agreements. Even where the EU already has a bilateral
cooperation agreement with the trading partner, as in the case of South Korea, a
part of the trade agreement will nevertheless be devoted to competition, though
97
typically with fewer details insofar as bilateral cooperation is concerned.
Second, some of the agreements, specifically those concluded with actual or
potential candidates for accession to the EU, tend toward “deep” integration, i.e.,
they focus on ‘behind the border’ issues. The EU enjoys sufficient political and
economic leverage in these scenarios to make the trade agreements in some sense
analogous to adhesion contracts, and the EU uses them to extend the reach of its
internal market (although free movement, especially free movement of persons,
may be subject to strict conditions and post-accession phase-ins). The EU thus
98
tends to extract far-reaching obligations from such countries. In the case of
agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners, there may well be
asymmetric bargaining power but, unlike the EU, the U.S. may not hold a
comparable trump card strong enough to insist on an isomorphic remodeling of
99
its trade partner’s substantive arrangements in the field of competition law. A

97. The inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements gives DG Trade an opportunity to
negotiate on matters which, in the context of bilateral cooperation agreements, would be negotiated by officials
of DG Competition. It is not entirely clear how policy coherence is managed between the two Directorates. It
has been intimated that the process may be relatively haphazard given the small number of individuals (i.e., ten)
working in the International Affairs Unit of DG Competition, who have a host of other duties to discharge. See
PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 106, n.44.
98. The EU is undoubtedly alive to the risk that a potential candidate country will undertake to adopt or
reform a competition law in such a way as to mimic EU rules but then fail to implement the reform in what the
EU regards as an adequate manner. See generally K.J. Cseres, The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the new
Member States, 6(2) COMPETITION L. REV. 145, 166-78 (2010). This may have been perceived as a risk
particularly in the case of countries with illiberal economic legacies. Cf. GERBER, supra note 4, at 197-8 (noting
the interest of the EU, in light of that risk, in exporting eastward its “more economic approach”). Such
implementation problems can rarely be solved by the content of international agreements alone; however, with
regard to actual and potential candidate countries, the EU has the leverage of conditionality not just until the
conclusion of an agreement but until the closing of accession negotiations and the subsequent ratification of the
accession treaty on the EU side (i.e., by all the Member States and by the EU itself). See Cseres, supra at 162
(citing Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 11 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 661 (2004)).
Once a country has joined the EU conditionality no longer plays a role, but of course membership entails the
normal obligations and enforcement mechanisms under the Treaties, including the possibility of direct
infringement procedures and indirect challenges via preliminary rulings. For an illustrative case (involving one
of the original Member States), see Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers,
Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW, 2010 E.C.R. I-12471.
99. An interesting question is why the EU has in fact not gone further and experimented with institutional
engineering in its agreements with suitor countries. For example, in the ‘Europe agreements’ that applied
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third point is that while the EU may enjoy only limited direct leverage with other
trade partners, i.e., those that have no realistic prospect of accession, this does not
necessarily mean that the EU is unable to influence them meaningfully. The
record is uneven but the EU—particularly where it is in a position to offer
financial aid and/or technical assistance—has been able to steer national
outcomes in the general direction of its preferences, as it has done for example in
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even in relation to the third category enumerated
above, i.e., countries that can negotiate with the EU on a more “equal” footing (in
particular because EU exporters are keen to gain access to their relatively larger
markets), the EU can at least potentially shape outcomes in the “socialization
through cooperation” (repeated game) manner referred to in connection with
100
first-generation bilateral cooperation agreements.
3. Conclusion on Bilateral Relationships
The idea proposed here is that the negotiation of a BCA or a TACP, and the
corresponding cooperation that ensues thereafter—which can be either formal,
with the actual triggering of the agreement’s provisions, or informal and
pragmatic in order to avoid the involvement of diplomatic channels or
cumbersome procedures—provides a conduit through which influence is exerted.
If the BCA or TACP is concluded between jurisdictions/authorities of
asymmetric power (or even where relative symmetry prevails), it may well be
motivated in part by the desire to maintain or spread influence. To a certain
extent there seems to be an ongoing competitive game involving the U.S. and EU
among others, in which “getting to” jurisdiction X before a rival does may yield
dividends to the extent that ideas, beliefs and techniques can be shaped through
those processes of negotiation and cooperation. The cultivation of bilateral
relationships may thus be regarded as another mode of global competition.
Within this mode of competition one may furthermore observe some degree of
product differentiation, with the U.S. tending to favor bilateral cooperation
agreements with ultimately discretionary commitments, and using MLATs where
between the EU and the countries that acceded to the Union in 2004 and 2007, there was no attempt to require
those countries to establish an “ideally” designed agency. Cf. Cseres, supra note 98, at 145. Two possible
explanations suggest themselves. First, institutional reforms may imply many more direct and indirect costs
than legislative reforms of a lesser order, and may thus appear to be more difficult to extract absent side
payments. Second, the adoption by the EU of a standard institutional model for ‘export’ might be seen as
inconsistent with the fact that the shape of competition enforcement institutions across the incumbent Member
States themselves is marked by considerable diversity. Nevertheless, despite the lack of obligations to embark
on institutional reforms, most of the “new” Member States (i.e., those acceding since 2004) have in fact
responded to the system of networked governance in the field of EU competition policy by establishing
institutional arrangements inspired by models typical of the older Member States (which are however in several
cases currently experiencing significant or radical restructuring). See id. at 155. With regard to the restructuring
of institutions, see generally EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2014: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES (Philip Lowe, Mel Marquis & Giorgio Monti eds., forthcoming).
100. GERBER, supra note 4, at 199-200.
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they apply, whereas the EU has generally preferred to incorporate competition
provisions (alongside political/democratic, social and cultural provisions) in
more formal agreements with its commercial partners, its neighbors, and the
102
countries that are or may one day be candidates applying for membership. That
is not to say that commitments made between the EU and its trading partners
need be formally obligatory; in general, the intensity of obligation depends on the
relative bargaining power of the parties, which means that those countries
seeking specific benefits from the EU will be subject to the greatest de facto
103
pressure, and those seeking membership will accept de jure commitments.
In addition to the varying degrees of normativity just mentioned, another
feature that distinguishes the competition chapters of EU trade agreements
compared to the provisions in U.S. agreements is the character and intensity of
104
the substance of the relevant provisions. The EU agreements go further
inasmuch as they provide that, when the common trade between the EU and its
partner is affected by a given business practice, EU-compatible competition rules
105
are to be applied to that conduct. (Conversely, where the common trade is not
affected, and where the trading partner is not an actual or candidate country
harmonizing its internal regime with that of the EU, the foreign jurisdiction
remains essentially free to maintain purely domestic rules that diverge entirely
106
from the EU rules. ) Where the EU can bring significant pressure to bear, in the
manner described above, it will go further still and oblige its partner to converge
substantively on EU rules by reforming national competition laws or adopting
107
new ones. This channel of “exportation” is not limited to rules on restrictive
agreements and abuse of dominance. The strong tendency of the EU to insist on
rules concerning state aid, public undertakings and undertakings with exclusive
or special rights further illustrates how the EU seeks to use its trade agreements
108
as vehicles of international (one-way) harmonization.

101. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 88.
102. Id. at 92.
103. Cf. id. at 138-141 (discussing the diverse methods of dispute settlement provided for in the EU’s
trade agreements, their intensity and their implications for the delegation/precision/obligation formula
mentioned supra note 74).
104. Id. at 104 (citing EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: STRATEGY PAPER
5 (2004)).
105. See id. at 105.
106. As a matter of EU law, even the Member States are permitted zones of substantive divergence when
trade between them cannot be affected, and sometimes even when it can be. However, a comparison between
third countries and EU Member States is doubtful since, in general, it seems more likely for any given
anticompetitive transaction or practice in a Member State to be capable of affecting trade between Member
States than it is for a given transaction or practice in a third country to affect trade with the EU. The direct
impact of a convergence rule in a third country will thus depend to some degree on the volume of its trade with
the EU as a proportion of its overall commerce.
107. PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 44, at 115.
108. Id. at 116-17, Table 4.3 (2010). Of course, rules designed to minimize or eliminate unnecessary
public obstacles to competition have been seen (somewhat akin to David Gerber’s point—see supra note 98) as

183

2015 / Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust
But there is another dimension of product differentiation that may be
signaled here as well, which is again linked to the philosophy behind the external
policies of the U.S. and the EU. This relates to the idea that promoting
competition law and policy within the context of a regional grouping, i.e., in a
manner modeled on the EU itself, is normatively desirable. For the countries
engaged in such initiatives, EU-style regionalism, including in this case regional
competition law, is often seen as a strategy that can at least potentially enable
them to overcome a variety of difficulties. With the growth of regional models of
competition law in their various forms, an implicit rivalry emerges between
regionalism and the quite different model generally employed and espoused by
the U.S. in its global relations. The next section briefly considers these
alternative models.
C. Regional Relationships
On the one hand, the international community has been unwilling to move
toward consensus on a formal multilateral framework for competition law (supra
section III.A). On the other, the shortcomings of nationally bounded competition
law in a commercially globalized environment persist. In addition to the bilateral
cooperation and trade agreements discussed above (supra section III.B), a natural
strategy for countries lacking the resources or experience necessary to maintain a
credible enforcement system acting alone is to develop formal and/or informal
cooperation mechanisms at a regional level. Lucian Cernat has observed that
many developing and transition countries in Asia, Central and Latin America and
above all Africa have in fact established such arrangements, some of which have
109
significant and problematic overlapping membership; and Michal Gal has
outlined the many reasons why in regional competition law solutions there is vast
110
potential waiting to be let loose. The result is a feast for acronym enthusiasts:
we may refer to, among others, ASEAN, CARICOM, OECS, CEMAC, SADC,
SACU, WAEMU, EAC, ECOWAS and COMESA, and the possibilities multiply
111
when other languages are used.
Apart from the sensible theoretical arguments in favor of regional initiatives,
the countries that have experimented with regional approaches to competition
essential inoculants for countries formerly under soviet control. See PAPADOPOULOS, supra at 115 (citing John
Litwack, Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies, 5(4) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 77 (1991)).
109. Lucian Cernat, Eager to ink, but ready to act? RTA proliferation and international co-operation on
competition policy, in COMPETITION PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW TO ASSURE
DEVELOPMENT GAINS 1 (Philippe Brusick, Ana Maria Alvarez, & Lucian Cernat eds., 2005).
110. Gal has written numerous thoughtful papers on the topic. See, e.g., Regional Competition Law
Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement, 60 U. TORONTO L. J. 239 (2010); International
antitrust solutions: Discrete steps or causally linked?, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW? 239, 251-60 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011).
111. See, e.g., Gal, Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement,
supra note 110, at 291.
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law enforcement had a clear point of reference: the European Community or
112
European Union. The EU plainly embodies a regional competition law regime
par excellence. And the European experience suggests that an indirect, if longterm benefit of a successful regional regime is the reinforcement of concurrent
national regimes. For example, it can no longer be said that the Netherlands is a
113
“cartel paradise.” Competition decisions in the UK are generally (i.e., putting
114
aside extraordinary cases) no longer made according to public interest criteria.
And in France, invigorated public enforcement is matched by a ‘competition
115
culture’ that has matured and is now almost taken for granted. For its part, and
anthropomorphizing a bit, the EU may be intoxicated by its own success (the
term “success” being necessarily relative given Europe’s penchant for existential
and constitutional crisis), and may be innately keen to encourage international
efforts to develop facsimiles or derivatives of EU solutions with varying degrees
of supranational content.
While the EU common market and competition model have influenced
several groupings to some extent, most explicitly so in the case of the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), a quite different model, that
of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), has by comparison been
neglected. The NAFTA Agreement provides for free trade among Canada,
Mexico and the U.S., but with respect to competition its provisions are
116
unambitious. Low-stakes cooperation in the NAFTA style also characterizes
the South African Development Community (SADC) and the South African

112. See, e.g., MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 412 (2010);
GERBER, supra note 4, at 256-57.
113. For the background to the Dutch story, see Bram Bouwens & Joost Dankers, The Invisible
Handshake: Cartelisation in the Netherlands, 1930-1980 (2009), presented at the XVth World Economic
History Conference, Utretcht, available at http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/seh/research/Lists/Seminar%20Program/
Attachments/102/bouwens_invisible_2007.pdf. See also Wendy Asbeek Brusse & Richard Griffiths, Paradise
Lost or Paradise Regained? Cartel Policy and Cartel Legislation in the Netherlands, in COMPETITION POLICIES
IN EUROPE 15 (Stephen Martin ed., 1998).
114. See STEPHEN WILKS, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION POLICY AND THE MONOPOLIES AND
MERGERS COMMISSION (1999).
115. See Laurence Idot, How Has Regulation N°1/2003 Affected the Role and Work of National
Competition Authorities? The French Example, CONCURRENCES, June 2013, at 1, 8-9.
116. Articles 1501(1) and 1501(2) NAFTA provide for mutual consultation from time to time regarding
the effectiveness of competition law measures undertaken by each Party; and provides further that “[t]he Parties
shall cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy, including mutual legal assistance, notification,
consultation and exchange of information [. . .]”. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1501(1) &
1501(2), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M (1993). However, Article 1501(1) specifically excludes recourse to dispute
settlement under the Agreement in relation to all of the above principles of cooperation. For more on the
competition provisions in the NAFTA agreement, see, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 356-60 (1997). While it is not yet known what specific form the
competition provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (U.S. plus eleven others) will take, it seems
unlikely that the agreement will go beyond mutual notification, the sharing of information (i.e., non-confidential
information unless a waiver is obtained) and other general modalities of cooperation. Id. at 358. The chapter on
regulatory coherence may have competition policy implications in a broader sense for some of the countries
concerned. Id. at 358-59.
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Customs Union (SACU); but nearly all other regional competition law
frameworks have taken the EU approach as a source of inspiration (translating it,
117
however, into highly diverse institutional structures and competences). The EU
has not been a neutral observer of this tendency; to the contrary, the EU has
financially underwritten some of the regional initiatives, including in particular
the WAEMU, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
118
and the Andean Community.
Despite the hopes one may have for regional competition law around the
world, it must be acknowledged that all of the initiatives, with the exception of
119
the EU itself, have yielded disappointing results. This seems to be the clear
120
thrust of recent evaluations. The situation is not hopeless. For example, the
tensions over jurisdictional claims regarding the application of competition and
merger control rules by COMESA may be overcome with time and iterative
adjustments. And a series of lessons may be drawn from the initial regional
121
integration efforts, which may guide reforms in the coming years. But a note of
pessimism is yet in order. With exceptions, the failings of regional agreements
122
thus far may be linked to problems that defy any remedy in the medium term.
One obvious cause of difficulty consists of the resource constraints afflicting the
countries and institutions that participate in the regional groupings, and the finite
123
well of international solidarity. Some of these countries also find themselves in
groupings with other countries of radically different character and level of
development. A still more brutal reality is that many of the latter countries bear
the unflattering title of “basket case” economies and political regimes, or even
borderline failed or failing states. Some are rife with corrupt institutions, some
are embroiled in civil or international wars or conflicts. Many of these regional
efforts thus face a grim horizon. Some may yet gain momentum and succeed: the
current intensification of cooperation within ASEAN, for example, may fuel

117. Alberto Heimler & Frederic Jenny, Regional Agreements, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION LAW
REGIMES: SELECTED ESSAYS 183, 183-201 (David Lewis ed., 2013).
118. Id. at 186.
119. Id. at 183, 186.
120. See the contributions in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 12; Heimler & Jenny, supra note 117. See also Alberto Heimler, Effectiveness of
Enforcement Cooperation in Developing Countries: What Role Can Existing Institutions Play?, Aug. 4, 2013, at
6-13, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335919 (skeptical about supranational
solutions and their cost, and suggesting a focus on simpler forms of cooperation); DABBAH, supra note 112, at
409-10, 412-17.
121. Careful syntheses of lessons are provided by Josef Drexl, Economic Integration and Competition
Law in Developing Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 231 and by Michal S. Gal & Inbal Faibish Wassmer, Regional Agreements of
Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the Potential, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 291. See also Fox and Gal, supra note 12, at 41-42.
122. DABBAH, supra note 112, at 416.
123. Id. at 414.
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rising expectations, although that organization too faces formidable challenges.
Others will likely go nowhere. They may have to be reborn or renounced, or they
may quietly wither.
For present purposes, one may simply note that competing models for
international cooperation were “on offer,” and the model promoted by the EU
proved to be far more appealing for ‘consumers’ worldwide than the available
alternative. The general failure of these consumers to use the EU prototype in a
sufficiently imaginative way, or the failure to realize that local conditions in
some areas likely required a new prototype or a sufficiently differentiated hybrid,
is a separate discussion that is omitted here.
D. Competition in Competition Ideas
In section III.A above, it was suggested that the U.S. and the EU endorsed
competing visions for a global governance architecture, to use a popular term, in
the field of competition law. At a different, more traditional level one may
observe a competitive struggle concerning the question of how antitrust problems
should be approached analytically by policy-making and decision-making
institutions. This friendly rivalry inevitably reflects something of a cleavage in
values and prior beliefs, and on each side of this cleavage a complex of smaller
but significant second-order fault lines may also be found. The terms of discourse
that follows are limited to “approaches” and “models”. Such an analysis can only
scratch the surface of the discussion surrounding values, beliefs and systems of
125
belief.

124. Barring possible delays, the ASEAN Economic Community is due to be launched at the end of 2015.
By that time each ASEAN member country is required to have promulgated a comprehensive competition law
(some will fail to meet this deadline). One feature of the new initiative will be a coordination mechanism for
competition law enforcement, the details of which remain to be worked out. ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN
Economic Community, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (2014), http://www.asean.org/
communities/asean-economic-community.
125. For a recent elaborate study, see Ioannis Lianos, Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of
EU Competition Law, in HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW: SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 1 (Damien
Geradin & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013). From a normative perspective, Lianos stresses that the interminable
debates on the goals of competition law too often omit the fundamental question of which institutions (markets,
judicial process, political process and so on), or rather which mix of institutions, should be assigned the task of
pursuing and implementing those goals. Comparing and then choosing among imperfect alternatives, he says,
should in fact precede debates over goals. In addition to this Komesarian (and, as applied to the competition law
sphere, Sokolian) normative perspective, Lianos’ essay provides a helpful map of the “goal structures” found in
both U.S. antitrust (a narrower structure, though not free of ambivalence) and EU competition law (broader,
evolving, contested). The essay covers utilitarian and welfarist traditions as well as deontological and processbased traditions, and casts doubt on some of the categories often taken for granted (raising, for example, the
possibility that at least some strands of ordoliberalism are consequentialist and not deontological). Id. at 33.
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1. The American Approach
In the United States, the Supreme Court and the federal antitrust agencies
(not to mention the heterogeneous state attorneys general) do not always see eye
to eye. Occasionally, for example, a federal enforcer will express doubts or
126
criticism regarding a Supreme Court judgment. Furthermore, while the
Supreme Court has shown rather little interest in applying techniques of modern
industrial economics (particularly where they seem to be merely speculative
“possibility theorems,” as the standard epithet describes them), the high degree of
expertise within the federal agencies enables them to engage in sophisticated
policy prescriptions (as in, e.g., the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines) and
sophisticated empirical work in connection with concrete cases (e.g., in
127
challenging the Staples/Office Depot merger ). But although a majority of the
Supreme Court may sometimes lean ‘to the right’ of the agencies, in particular
when the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust has been appointed by a
Democratic President and given the mandatory bipartisan composition of the
128
Federal Trade Commission,
the general paradigms and background
assumptions embraced by each of these institutions are not very different. Inhouse, the agencies may engage routinely in game-theoretic exercises and may
explore dynamic competitive effects in great detail, but the point of departure
when analyzing a competition problem is the same question that has been asked
throughout the 1980s and the 1990s: when assessing competitive effects, what
129
will be the net effect on output? Doubt is resolved in favor of non-intervention,
which reflects a faith in the relative superiority of markets (vis-à-vis occasionally
frail institutions) that remarkably persists even today, dissenters “on the left”
130
notwithstanding, within the antitrust milieu. This faith is captured in formulas

126. In several speeches, for instance, then-FTC Commissioner Tom Rosch questioned the wisdom of
certain obiter dicta in the Supreme Court’s Trinko judgment (Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398 (2004)), which is notable for, among other things, its contention that rigorous
antitrust constraints can dampen the incentive of companies to strive toward superior performance and enhanced
innovation.
127. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Econometric
Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 11 (1999).
128. Bipartisan here means, as American readers are well aware, 3:2, or 2:2 if the 5th seat is temporarily
vacant. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2014).
129. It will be plain that no significant investigation of output effects is conducted in cases involving, in
particular, naked anticompetitive conspiracies between competitors.
130. It is said that one need not dig deep to find, underneath the economics-based claim that nonintervention in the absence of demonstrable output effects guarantees efficient case outcomes, a distinct
political ideology. This political ideology attaches great weight to the “autonomy of the dominant or leading
firms”, and it produces a stylized concept of efficiency that systematically excludes the possibility that
efficiency (in particular, dynamic efficiency) could best be served by protecting rivalry, mavericks and
“upstarts”. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 86 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
The paradox, then, is that, as it has come to be understood and applied, the efficiency orientation that dictates
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that have been fondly recited on occasion by U.S. enforcers, such as “First, do no
harm” or “Let the markets work”.
The output model, framed by the idea that type I errors are more costly than
131
type II errors, and that abstention is therefore the proper course when it is not
clear—either on “per se” logic or following a (full or truncated) “rule of reason”
inquiry—that a practice will lead to a net loss of output, may be encapsulated by
the term “Chicago school antitrust” (even though Chicago is composed of
different strands of thought not free of internal tensions). But the idea of a
Chicago-based output model must be nuanced because an ulterior question can
determine non-intervention even where it is found that net output would suffer as
a result of a given practice. The ulterior question is: even if we can say abstractly
that certain behavior can yield either greater or lesser output depending on a
variety of factors that have to be examined case-by-case, is a typical judge (or a
lay jury) capable of engaging in such inquiry, admittedly with the aid of an
adversarial process, and reaching the right result within a tolerable margin of
error? In the United States, the approach to the latter question is influenced by
the consequences of erroneous judgments, as they can by statute lead to heavy
civil liability (or to out-of-court settlements in the shadow of that liability risk).
Although this concept of “administrability”—i.e., the question of whether tools

antitrust law in the U.S. “protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses innovative challenges, and stifles
efficiency,” id. at 77, and “thus protects inefficiency,” id. at 88.
131. Error-cost reasoning is the influential legacy of work done especially in the 1980s by then-Professor
Frank Easterbrook. While this reasoning seeks to minimize both type I and type II errors, there is also a
common tenet, suggested by Easterbrook himself (inspired by Ronald Coase’s work) according to which a type
I error (false conviction) is more costly than a type II error (false acquittal). The basic point rests on two
assumptions: on the one hand, although a false acquittal will result in or prolong an anticompetitive practice
(and its related rents), the marketplace will ultimately resolve the matter through self-healing (e.g., new entry,
perhaps enabled by efficient access to capital); on the other hand, a false conviction will amount to a distorted
market interference by government that cannot be corrected through the same self-healing properties of the
market. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984). Courts and
agencies might thus ironically become ‘anticompetitive’ instrumentalities of consumer harm. The idea that the
risk of false positives should be accorded greater weight than the risk of false negatives is of course pointedly
contested. See, e.g., John Fingleton & Ali Nikpay, Stimulating or Chilling Competition, in FORDHAM
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 385, 388-90 (Barry E. Hawk ed.,
2009); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (2010). In the context of
themes running through the present paper it is worth underlining that Easterbrook’s point of view is clearly
based on what he perceived as robust markets, which may be true in the U.S. but is hardly a universally reliable
assumption. See Philippe Brusick & Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry About Abuse of
Dominant Power?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 269, 274-7 (2008). David Lewis, for example, describes a quite different
balance between over-enforcement and under-enforcement in Chilling Competition, in FORDHAM COMPETITION
LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY, supra, at 419, 420-5. Cf. Alberto Heimler &
Kirtikumar Mehta, Monopolization in Developing Countries, Oct. 3, 2013, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335653. In the latter paper, Heimler and Mehta make a
similar observation about the distinctiveness of the U.S. and add, at the last page of the draft, that an empirical
review reveals that young jurisdictions have “well understood” the risk of false positives in abuse of dominance
cases. They point out that the focus of competition authorities in these jurisdictions has been actual foreclosure
“rather than a preoccupation with restrictions of competition that may give grounds for assuming potential
foreclosure.” Id. at 18.
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and concepts (as applied to liability rules but also to remedies) can be applied
workably in concrete settings—has driven first and foremost the Supreme Court,
the federal agencies necessarily internalize the concept in their own decisionmaking. It is remarkable that with regard to both values just described (output is
to be maximized, and liability rules must be administrable), doubt is to be
resolved in favor of abstention. Two different “schools” thus have common
ground to stand on. Bill Kovacic has captured this confluence of ideas with the
132
metaphor of a double helix. Beyond the pruning of liability rules and the
strengthening of procedural filters to minimize the number of cases that survive,
the double helix is also reflected in the Supreme Court’s philosophy of the scope
of antitrust: in particular, in sectors governed substantially by regulation, such as
network industries or markets subject to security laws, antitrust has in effect been
133
relieved from its post.
To abbreviate, and though certain authors have sometimes used other labels,
the U.S. model of antitrust can be summed up roughly as an “output” model or a
“double helix” model, as nuanced above. What of the European Union?
2. Europe’s Approach(es)
Here too, distinctions should be drawn between the way EU competition law
is understood by the EU Courts, and especially the ECJ, and the way it is
134
understood by the “agency”, i.e., the European Commission. A further
distinction may be made with respect to the authors of the competition rules
contained in the Treaty of Rome, today known as the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union. At least traditionally there has been a widespread belief
135
in Europe that the competition rules were of ordoliberal content. There are

132. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm
Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2007); See also William H. Page,
Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909
(1996); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917 (2003) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001)); For recent discussion, see generally Nicola Giocoli, Old Lady
Charm: Explaining the Persistent Appeal of Chicago Antitrust, May 30, 2012, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070666.
133. See generally, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Daniel E. Haar, Resolving Conflicts between
Competition and Other Values: The Roles of Courts and Other Institutions in the US and the EU, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2012: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES 417 (Philip Lowe & Mel
Marquis eds., 2014).
134. The importance of considering differences between courts and agencies in any analysis of
competition law where courts play a significant role is likewise highlighted in Eleanor Fox, Monopolization and
Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Different, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014) (discussing, inter alia, the
divergent case law in the U.S. and the EU).
135. It is always useful to recall that the ordoliberal tradition comprises diverse strands with occasionally
quite distinct points of emphasis. Elaborate discussion is out of place here but it may be noted that the crucial
“Hayekian turn” in ordoliberal studies occurred only after the composition of the competition rules of the
Treaty. To the extent that those rules bear some ordoliberal paternity, therefore, the link would appear to be
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good reasons to doubt that the shaping of the competition rules was driven solely
by ordoliberal ideas. More accurately, their genesis reflected a compromise
between very different competition-related values (e.g., on the one hand the
desire to have an “economic constitution” protecting economic liberty against
coercion from private and public sources of power, and on the other hand the
desire to promote industrial upsizing, efficient production and global
136
competitiveness). However, those who underline the ordoliberal character of
European competition law are on firmer ground when referring to the policies
and agency culture of DG IV within the European Commission, in particular
137
during the period from the 1960s through the 1980s.
limited to the “formative” ordo era, which preceded the fusion of many of the original concepts with Austrian
ideas about competition, liberty, the State and the social order.
136. Researchers scrutinizing the archived preparatory documents have reached rather different
conclusions, but one author has argued strenuously that there is little evidence of ordoliberal influence in the
relevant documents. See Pinar Akman, Searching for the long-lost soul of Article 82 EC, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 267 (2009). While the latter paper is an illuminating and essential contribution, my own impression, due
to the context of the negotiations as a whole (whose linkages included a significant agreement to postpone
decisions on fundamental issues such as how the enforcement of the rules should be structured, who should
enforce them and with what powers, etc.), is that smoking gun evidence of an ordoliberal program with regard
to Articles 101 and 102 is indeed scarce (other than the final, “trump” condition contained in Article 101(3),
whose activation however has normally been pre-empted by the way Article 101 and the other conditions of
Article 101(3) have been applied) because the German negotiators who were ordoliberally inclined may not
have been particularly doctrinaire to begin with (at least as regards Müller-Armack; as for von der Groeben, his
views seem to have become more resolutely “ordo” at a later stage when he was made DG IV’s chieftain), and
because the compromises made (which were conditioned in part by the long-running legislative debate in
Germany) may have diluted what otherwise might have been rules of more distinct ordoliberal character
(although, as regards Article 102, it has been noted that as of the late 1950s the ordoliberals had not fully
worked out an approach to the treatment of dominant firms: see Heike Schweitzer, The History, Interpretation
and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 119 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds.,
2008). That dilution does not mean that the ordoliberal influence was absent. Widening the lens beyond Article
101 and 102, one could take the view that, apart from the Common Agricultural Policy, the Treaty as a
comprehensive instrument, and especially its common market planks (including the free movement rules but
also state aid and tax discrimination rules), coincided rather closely with ordoliberal views. The difficulty lies in
separating out causal elements, since one could make a similar point about any orientation (in particular,
Ricardian trade theory) that was based on the classical liberal tradition, to which the ordo scholars decidedly
belonged. Even with respect to Article 106 (which provides that Member States must respect the rules of the
Treaty including in particular its competition rules), although I have elsewhere followed J.O. Haley in
recognizing its affinity with ordo values, that provision was originally proposed by the negotiators from the
Benelux countries (as an antidote to France’s intimidating public sector); the German delegation merely
endorsed the idea once it had been introduced. Having drifted too far already, the excursus may be cut short
with two quick points. First, notwithstanding the above observations, Akman’s point that the ordoliberal genesis
of Article 102 has been greatly exaggerated is easy to accept; it is now being incorporated into textbooks, for
example. See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW, 7 EDITION 22, 196 (2012). Second, as
EU lawyers know but as others may not, the “original intent” of the Treaty of Rome counts legally for nothing.
(See, e.g., Schweitzer, History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles, cited above; Lianos, supra note 125,
at 71-72, with references.) The canons of interpretation developed by the ECJ leave it free to follow a path
completely contrary to any discernible original design if this contrary path were divined by the Court to be the
Treaty’s true telos.
137. Historians do not unanimously support this claim, however, since, for example, DG IV also had its
share of social democrats, including those of a Dutch persuasion. For contrasting views, see the various
TH
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Since the 1990s, DG IV (now DG Competition) has absorbed many
influences that have shaped its policies. It has drawn eclectically on “modern”
approaches that it perceives to be consistent with its mission as a competition
enforcer. Famously, it decided to break with old institutional habits and to turn
138
toward a “more economic” approach, a vague expression that has at least two
related dimensions. First, in (i) selecting and de-selecting cases, (ii) resolving or
settling selected cases, and (iii) building policy approaches, DG Competition has
embraced tenets and techniques associated with certain branches of economic
theory and research. Since the late 1990s, for example, its policies on the control
of vertical agreements have been palpably influenced by transaction cost
economics. And DG Comp has been open to the theoretical advances of postChicago industrial organization studies. Post-Chicago concerns regarding
unilateral conduct, vertical foreclosure in general, and, in the field of horizontal
merger control (and like the U.S. agencies), unilateral effects from concentrations
in differentiated markets, have shaped both the policies and practice of the
Commission. A second dimension of the “more economic” approach concerns
139
the choice of policy objectives. In a move of both practical and symbolic
significance, the Commission, particularly under the leadership of Mario Monti
140
and Neelie Kroes, adopted “consumer welfare” as its magnetic North.
141
Consumer welfare, however, can be understood in different ways. In the U.S.,
consumer welfare is sometimes confusingly used as a synonym for the (generally
142
short-run) welfare of society as a whole. As used in the EU, the standard view
143
is that the term consumer welfare reflects a criterion of distributive justice and
tends to denote a narrower concept in which producer welfare is important but

contributions in THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike
Schweitzer eds., 2013).
138. DG Comp’s policy turn toward “more” economics has provoked a significant field of critical
literature. See, e.g., Heike Schweitzer, The Role of Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law, in
TECHNOLOGIE ET CONCURRENCE: MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE HANNS ULLRICH [TECHNOLOGY AND
COMPETITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HANNS ULLICH] 511 (Josef Drexl, Reto Hilty, Laurence Boy, Christine
Godt & Bernard Remiche eds., 2009).
139. As noted earlier, the term “more economic approach” appears to leaves room for the Commission to
factor in non-economic concerns, and the boundaries of the Commission’s discretion in this regard are not
entirely clear. See supra note 21.
140. See, e.g., Lianos, supra note 125, at 19-20.
141. In further detail, see id. at 20-23.
142. This very loose use of language is associated with the Chicago school and with Robert Bork in
particular. See generally, e.g., RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, REVISED EDITION, 240245, 374 (1996); See also J. Thomas Rosch, [then-] Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, I say
Monopoly, You say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, is it the
Economics?, Address Before the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isaymonopolyiba.pdf, at 16; Charles Rule & David Meyer, An Antitrust
Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of All Consumers, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 677 (1988).
143. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 26-29. However, as Lianos points out, lurking in even the most
aseptic version of a maximum efficiency norm is a choice about distributive effects. See id. at 9, 57.
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144

ultimately of a lower rank. Truer to its name, consumer welfare thus does not
refer to an “output” model but to a long-run consumer welfare criterion more
consistent with the idea of a dynamic “competitive process” in which potential
threats to competition, such as where new entrants or “mavericks” might be
suppressed or brought to heel, are treated seriously. The idea that defending the
“competitive process” in the sense of maintaining ongoing rivalry and an
145
“effective competition structure”
(which today is often – though not
uncontroversially – linked to competition from hypothetical equally-efficient
rivals as opposed to competition from all comers irrespective of relative
146
efficiency ) takes precedence over short-term efficiency gains is thought to be
144. In the context of the exemption contained in Article 101(3) as understood by the Commission,
Whish and Bailey explain that “[i]t is the beneficial nature of the effect on all consumers in the relevant markets
that must be taken into consideration [. . .] Negative effects on consumers in one geographic or product market
cannot normally be balanced against and compensated by positive effects for consumers in unrelated markets
[unless the markets are related and] the consumers affected by the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency
gains are substantially the same.” WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 136, at 22, 163. In order for the exemption to
apply, it is not necessary to show that a particular consumer who is harmed is then compensated for his
particular injury. Giorgio Monti fleshes this out further in a hypothetical vertical restraint scenario where the
restraint purports to expand the market: “[O]ne looks at the ‘overall impact’ on consumers affected by the
agreement. So if before the vertical restraint 100 consumers bought the good, and after the restraint there are
200 new customers, the overall effect is positive and the practice benefits from Article [101(3)]. Yet it may not
be easy to do this kind of calculation at all (it will necessarily be an ex ante assessment in that one will want to
enjoin the restraint before it has a significant market impact), and when comparing qualitative improvements
and price increases the Commission acknowledges that this will be a matter of ‘value judgment’.” See Monti,
supra note 21, at 9.
145. The “competitive process” idea seems necessarily to require an approach to competition law that is
sensitive to market structure, but any parallel to be drawn with the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm
(pioneered and pursued by economists such as Edward Mason, Joe Bain, Corwin Edwards, Carl Kaysen and
economist/lawyer Don Turner among others) must be qualified because of the generally static conception of the
latter, from which the former diverges entirely. See, e.g., (in English), Erich Hoppmann, The Development of an
Idea on the Norm for a Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968); and for a concise account,
Roger Van den Bergh & Peter Camesasca, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE, 2 EDITION 89-90 (2006) (also referring to post-Hoppmann approaches that differ on details).
The idea of the competitive process is closely linked to that of the “freedom to compete”, or
Wettbewerbsfreiheit. A recent description is provided in Roger Zäch & Adrian Künzler, Freedom to Compete or
Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition Law according to Constitutional Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMPETITION LAW 61 (Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann & Andreas Kellerhals eds., 2010). As the authors
state, “[t]he goal of competition law [. . .] is to ensure the freedom to compete of individuals and thus to
safeguard the competitive process”. Id. at 61. The freedom to compete then “generally leads to competition and
competition leads to an efficient allocation of resources and thus to consumer welfare”. Id. Although it appears
that protecting the freedom to compete is “thus to safeguard the competitive process,” this can be understood
the other way around: if the competitive process is protected then individuals are guaranteed the possibility to
exercise their economic liberty. But the central point for the European “efficiency versus freedom” debate is
that consumer welfare is expected to be no more than, and no less than, an anticipated by-product of the
freedom to compete paradigm. For a discussion of varying views within the economic freedom tradition, see
Lianos supra note 125, at 30-36.
146. Traces of the idea that foreclosure of equally efficient competitors may deserve closer scrutiny
because their exclusion has more serious consequences for consumers may be seen in its earlier case law, but
the ECJ now seems to be embracing the idea more firmly. See Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission, 2010
E.C.R. I-9555 (various paragraphs); Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527 (various
paragraphs); Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet, judgment of the ECJ of 27 March 2012,
ND
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consistent with the Treaty; and at the same time it may preserve some (limited)
degree of continuity with DG Comp’s “ordoliberal” past, in which the policy
paradigm depended on the conception of competition as a dynamic process
(which in turn is partly informed by the notion of competition as a discovery
procedure). The Commission’s interest in post-Chicago approaches and its
tendency to avoid overvaluing short-term efficiency gains results in a greater
readiness to intervene in competition cases, and implicitly signals a greater faith
in its own relative ability to secure desired outcomes compared to the ability of
“the market” to do so. In this regard the Commission’s slogan, “making markets
147
work better” (emphasis added), is quite telling.
Finally, there are the EU Courts, and in particular the ECJ. Contrary to what
is sometimes loosely asserted, the idea that the Court was in its heyday (or was
then and still is) an ordoliberal institution has never been convincingly
148
established. It is submitted, rather, that perhaps with some exceptions any
ordoliberal-inflected judgments of the Court were produced not on any
endogenous basis resting on the identity or predilections of the judges
individually or collectively, but rather because a disposition of a given case that
was consistent with ordoliberal views fit well under the circumstances with the
Court’s vision of the Treaty, in particular its free movement and competition
rules and associated doctrines such as the “effet utile” of those rules, and of
European integration. Here one could cite judgments such as those in Continental
149
Can, Dassonville and perhaps Säger and France v Commission. It must be
added, though, that in recent years the ECJ has embraced a notion which, among
ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶¶ 21, 25 and 38). The ECJ may have different views with regard to the “equally
efficient competitor” concept in the specific context of conditional rebates granted by a dominant firm, but
pending cases will permit the ECJ to clarify its position and to resolve this tension if it so chooses. (For starkly
contrasting views in this regard, compare Wouter Wils, The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the
So-Called More Economic Approach to Abuse of Dominance, 37 WORLD COMPETITION 405 (2014) with,
among others, Luc Peeperkorn, Conditional pricing: Why the General Court is wrong in Intel and what the
Court of Justice can do to rebalance the assessment of rebates, CONCURRENCES No. 1-2015, p. 43.) As a matter
of policy, the Commission reserves for itself some room for maneuver in cases where dominant firm conduct
threatens to expel from the market a less efficient rival whose presence is apt to lead to a more competitive
outcome relative to the counterfactual. See GUIDANCE ON THE COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 82 OF THE EC TREATY TO ABUSIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BY DOMINANT
UNDERTAKINGS, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, para. 24 (“The Commission will take a dynamic view of [the constraint
imposed by the less efficient rival], given that in the absence of an abusive practice such a competitor may
benefit from demand-related advantages, such as network and learning effects, which will tend to enhance its
efficiency.”).
147. This motto has appeared prominently on the Commission’s competition home page. See European
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html (last visited October 24, 2014).
148. A recent review of the ECJ’s antitrust jurisprudence rejects the notion that the Court has been
concerned with the (German and Hayek-derived) concept of a “freedom to compete” (see supra note 145),
which is an important but not the only version of an ordoliberal program. See Pinar Akman, The role of
“freedom” in EU competition law, 34 LEGAL STUD. 183 (2014).
149. Respectively: Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215; Procureur du
Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837; Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co Ltd, 1991 E.C.R. I-4221; France v.
Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223.
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other interpretations, may appear to be compatible with ordoliberal thought. It is
the idea that the EU legal order must protect competition “as such (as an
150
institution).” When taken literally, this idea seems to transform competition
from a medium through which ulterior values such as social welfare or consumer
welfare are pursued into a self-justifying end goal. The adoption of the “as such”
151
formula by the Court in its T-Mobile judgment may have seemed to vindicate,
to some extent, the popular criticism that the ECJ was an “ordoliberal” Court and
was therefore (i) biased against concepts such as anticompetitive foreclosure,
whereby foreclosure would only be a concern if the excluded rival were efficient,
since otherwise consumers would not in general be any worse off, and (ii) biased,
152
more generally, against any tradeoffs between liberty and efficiency. It is not
153
clear that ordoliberalism is really at play here, but it is clear that there is a
concern for market structure and for the plight of at least some competitors and
some consumers, all of which if interpreted in a certain way can be reconstructed,
by those who wish to do so, as being part of an ordoliberal approach. In any
event, the ECJ’s preoccupation with competition “as such” now seems to be a
154
staple of Article 101 jurisprudence. In the context of Article 102 the Court has
150. This formula originated in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in British Airways plc., 2007
E.C.R. I-2331. As the Advocate General states in para. 68: “Article [102 TFEU], like the other competition
rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors
or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution), which
has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market.” (Emphasis in original;
citations to case law omitted.) The foregoing quote, which on the surface appears to reflect an ordoliberal
commitment to competition’s “constitutional” nature, should be considered in light of the text that immediately
follows in the same paragraph: “In this way [i.e., by protecting competition as such], consumers are also
indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be
feared.” The latter idea—that the structure of the market is protected in pursuit of an ulterior objective (i.e., the
avoidance of consumer disadvantage)—appears to be at odds with the standard ordoliberal view that consumer
benefits, while important, materialize as a subsidiary by-product of the competitive process (see supra note
145). Similarly, the counterintuitive idea that the “competition as such” imperative in fact instrumentalizes
competition in service of efficient resource allocation and the diverse aims of the EU has been noted as a
plausible interpretation. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 53.
151. T-Mobile Netherlands, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529, ¶ 38: “[A]s the Advocate General pointed out at point 58
of her Opinion, [Article 101 TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not
only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the
market and thus competition as such.” For her part, Advocate General Kokott had directly transposed to the
instant case the “as such (as an institution)” concept that she had announced in British Airways (quoted in the
previous footnote). Paragraph 58 of her Opinion in T-Mobile Netherlands states: “[Article 101 TFEU], like the
other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of
individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as
an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is
damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.” (Emphasis in original.)
152. However, the Court in British Airways also confirmed that dominant firms could come forward in
Article 102 cases with evidence of efficiencies counterbalancing the anticompetitive effects of their behavior.
See British Airways plc., 2007 E.C.R. I-2331.
153. There is a risk that the “as such (as an institution)” language will be decontextualized. See supra note
150, particularly where Kokott’s coda to the quoted language appears.
154. See GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited, 2009 E.C.R. I-9291, ¶ 63 (“like other competition rules
laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of
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not (yet) seized the opportunity to “reimport” the “competition as such” logic,
even if it is where firms are dominant that the presumed “weakness” of the
155
market structure is most likely to be a concern.
An opportunity for such a reimport presented itself in a 2012 case that
attracted some attention, but the Court took a different tack and proceeded to
clarify that Article 102 in no way precludes dominant companies from competing
156
“on the merits.” This normally ambiguous phrase—on the merits—is now
defined by the ECJ as competition on the basis of features appreciated by
157
consumers: better offers in terms of price, quality, choice and innovation. The
fate of the “competition as such” concept remains to be seen, and the Court might
well decide to incorporate it within its Article 102 case law (rather than allowing
the apparent asymmetry of the two fields to persist). But whether it is
“competition as such” or “competition on the merits” as now defined (or an
awkward admixture of the two) that guides the Court’s future jurisprudence,
neither concept is likely to alter the Court’s trademark approach in cases where
agreements or practices have the actual or potential impact of dividing the
158
internal market along territorial lines coinciding with national borders. Here all
bets are off, and the integrationist “genome” of the Treaty will in most cases preconsumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such”); Protimonopolný úrad
Slovenskej republiky, judgment of the ECJ of 7 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:71. Similarly, see Visa Europe
and Visa Int’l Serv., 2011 E.C.R. II-1729 (interests of competitors and of consumers, the structure of the market
and “competition as such”).
155. The conventional judicial wisdom has been that, in Europe, dominant firms have a “special
responsibility” not to distort competition any more than the very existence of the dominant position has already
distorted it. This line of thinking is sometimes portrayed as quite innocuous but it seems to establish a kind of
informal and unconscious suspicion of aggressive competitive behavior by dominant firms; it has occasionally
led to dangerous conclusions. For example, in Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶ 664, the then-Court of First
Instance stated that “Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server operating
systems market by acquiring a significant market share on that market.” This improvident remark, when taken
literally, evinces a gross misunderstanding of Article 102, under which a firm can by no means infringe the
provision merely by gaining market share or even growing to become a monopoly in a given market. For further
discussion of the “special responsibility” doctrine, see Kathryn McMahon, A Reformed Approach to Article 82
and the Special Responsibility Not To Distort Competition, in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT
EVOLUTION 121 (Ariel Ezrachi ed., 2009).
156. Post Danmark A/S, 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶¶ 22, 25. For discussion of Post Danmark, see
Ekaterina Rousseva & Mel Marquis, Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct
under Article 102 TFEU, 4 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 32 (2013). While the judgment is welcomed as
a positive development, Rousseva and Marquis point out at pages 47-48 that the case law of the ECJ seems to
be moving simultaneously in different directions, particularly when its jurisprudence on conditional rebates
granted by dominant firms is taken into account. It appears likely that the Court will have the opportunity to
rectify this, or to fail to do so, within a few years.
157. See Post Danmark A/S, ECLI:EU:C:2012:172, ¶ 22.
158. As Barry Hawk once said, the aim to establish and maintain a single market was the “first principle”
of European competition law. As Arved Deringer once said, impeding market integration was a “basic sin.” See
Clifford Jones, The Second Devolution of European Competition Law: Empowering National Courts, National
Authorities, and Private Litigants in the Expanding European Union, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ARCHIVE OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Mar. 29, 2003), http://aei.pitt.edu/2882/. Many have written about the centrality of
the market integration objective in the sphere of EEC/EC/EU competition law. For a recent summary, see
Lianos supra note 125, at 17-19.
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determine the outcome. In the absence of very exceptional circumstances, any
practice that significantly hinders the free movement of goods or services will be
held unlawful. This special and crucial zone of jurisprudence also aligns the
Court, for “exogenous” rather than “endogenous” reasons, with the ordoliberal
idea that public and private constraints on economic liberty must be prevented or
dismantled.
While the US model can be reduced either to the words “output model”,
which is simplistic but on the whole reasonably accurate, or to the more nuanced
“double helix” model, it is more difficult to capture the EU model in a short
phrase, especially since it may be an amalgamation of several models. A point of
departure is that EU competition law is not statutory law subject to lex posterior
derogat, but “primary” law. It is elevated, in material though not formal terms to
the rank of constitutional law (since by judicial interpretation the Treaty,
159
materially but not formally, establishes a constitutional order). This implies,
among other things, that from a legal point of view, and contrary to the U.S.
position (see above), it would be entirely objectionable if the Court of Justice
were to hold simply that the presence of sector-specific regulation renders
application of the EU competition rules in the given sector redundant or wasteful.
To the contrary, in the EU system, competition rules co-habit with regulation
159. The premise here–i.e., that while the Sherman Act may be a potent social symbol it is not legally
imbued with constitutional status–may be contrasted with the less orthodox view presented in Zäch & Künzler,
supra note 145. According to these authors, antitrust legislation in the U.S. “came to be viewed as a charter of
freedom on a par with the Bill of Rights. The constitutional status of American anti-trust legislation is
emphasized in the paradigmatic arguments of the US Supreme Court ruling in the case of Topco Assocs. Inc.,
405 U.S. 596. ‘Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete [. . .]’ The goal of [the Sherman Act, as
amended by the Clayton Act] is to protect the individual’s freedom to compete. In contrast, consumer welfare as
such is not mentioned. Thus the legislation correctly implemented the constitutional mandate.” Zäch & Künzler,
supra note 145, at 65-66. From the standpoint of constitutional law, it cannot be concluded that the lush
language used by the Supreme Court in Topco elevated the Sherman Act to the rank of constitutional law, or
even to any intermediate super-statutory status. First, as a matter of context, and putting aside the obiter nature
of the quote (and putting aside the fact that the Court’s later case law on horizontal restraints was seldom guided
by Topco, a rare exception being Palmer, 498 U.S. 46, 49-50), Justice Marshall in Topco spoke for five justices;
Chief Justice Burger dissented, Justice Blackmun concurred only in the result (not the reasoning), and neither
Powell nor Rehnquist participated in the judgment. Against that background, consider a case decided shortly
after Topco but before the Court’s volte face in the well-known case of GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36. Specifically,
in Gordon, 422 U.S. 659, 685-86, the same Supreme Court justices that had decided Topco (but with Powell
and Rehnquist this time) held unanimously that a law adopted by Congress after it adopted the Sherman Act—
in this case the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934—had repealed the Sherman Act insofar as SEC
implementing regulations allowed a stock exchange to determine the commissions charged by member
brokerage firms; in essence, the Congress was thereby able to carve out an exemption for such an agreement,
which otherwise would have been per se illegal, from the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. There is
a conspicuous absence of the Magna Carta language of Topco, or of any comparable language, and the Sherman
Act was treated as an ordinary statute. Several other (and more recent) examples of both express and implied
repeal of the Sherman Act by the Congress—including even the Clayton Act itself, which trimmed the scope of
the Sherman Act in relation to labor unions and agriculture—could be mentioned. See also Ginsburg & Haar,
supra note 133.
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(whether of national or EU legislative origin), and will generally take precedence
160
in case of conflict. The rules can be applied in particular where, for example for
161
public choice reasons, such regulation is incompatible with the competition
rules or where a regulatory system has failed, systematically or as applied in a
162
163
given case. This system of hierarchy follows from basic principles of EU law.
Sometimes, in discussions of institutional design the crucial question of the rank
164
that should be assigned to competition law is neglected, but this simple
example of differences in the scope of U.S. law and that of EU law underlines the
importance of that issue. Moving beyond the matters of scope and hierarchies of
norms, Eleanor Fox emphasizes that EU competition law protects “rivalry” and

160. There is a well-known derogation for services of general economic interest, but it does not apply
automatically and it does not entail sector-wide exemptions. Indeed, the sectoral exemptions (or partial
exemptions) that apply today under EU law are comparatively few. The Euratom Treaty creates a special
regime in the field of non-military use of nuclear materials, but this does not establish a blanket exemption for
the nuclear industry; in light of Article 106a(3) Euratom, and despite a textual deletion made by the Treaty of
Lisbon, Euratom precludes the application of the TFEU competition rules where supply or pricing activities are
specifically regulated under the latter Treaty (agreements concerning the supply of nuclear equipment and
agreements between producers of nuclear materials are not so regulated). The TFEU establishes partial
derogations for agriculture and transport (where secondary law is relevant) and for military equipment.
Secondary law establishes limited “block” exemptions in the insurance and motor vehicle sectors. To consult
the relevant provisions, see Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/ handbook_vol_3_en.pdf.
161. See, e.g., HEIMLER, supra note 50 (highlighting the option of insulating competition law from the
vagaries and distributional effects of special interest politics by way of constitutionalizing competition rules
framed in general terms, as the Treaty of Rome does (and citing the “Hilmer Report”: FREDERICK HILMER ET
AL., NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY (Australian Government, 1993), http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National%20
Competition%20Policy%20Review%20report,%20The%20Hilmer%20Report,%20August%201993.pdf).
162. If the regulation (or the relevant public authority’s decision) has the effect of removing an
undertaking’s autonomy so that the undertaking is essentially compelled to act contrary to the competition rules,
the undertaking will legally be free of fault but the Treaty rules may nevertheless potentially apply as against
the author of the regulation (or the against the authority, as the case may be). Further exposition of this subject
is beyond the scope of this article.
163. See Deutsche Telekom, 2010 E.C.R. I-9555; Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the
EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft,
IMS, and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1519, 1549 (2004); PIERRE LAROUCHE, Contrasting
Legal Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US Experiences, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU
AND US 76, 84-86 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds. 2009); Alexandre de Streel, Background Paper,
in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE REGULATED CONDUCT DEFENCE 39-40 (BOX 3) (DAF/COMP
2011); MONTI, supra note 11, at 355; GINSBURG AND HAAR, supra note 133 at fn 13 and accompanying text.
For further discussion on the relationship between the EU competition rules and sectoral regulation, see, e.g.,
Alexandre de Streel, Interaction between the Competition Rules and Sector-Specific Regulation, in LAURENT
GARZANITI & MATTHEW O’REGAN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, BROADCASTING, AND THE INTERNET - EU
COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION 867 (3rd ed. 2010).
164. One can appreciate the pragmatic reasons for this neglect. Constitutional reform tends to be a rare
event, and building up the necessary momentum to reform a constitution merely to embed competition rules
within it is not realistic. Any such reforms would normally have to accompany wider discussion of
constitutional change. Furthermore, the conventional idea of constitutional law tends to pre-suppose that the
rule of law is firmly in place, which is certainly not universally so.
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“openness” of markets, and in doing so she describes the enforcement tendency
without needing to identify the underlying philosophy. It is sometimes said that
Europe embraces a “competitive process” model, but this immediately poses
difficulties because in the US, the term “competitive process” has very different,
166
often Darwinist connotations linked closely to short-term welfare and output.
For that matter, this problem of language is being compounded in the sense that
the protection of an “effective competitive process” has become a popular
formulation of competition law objectives for a variety of jurisdictions and is
167
thus becoming increasingly entrenched, as seen in the work of the ICN.
Perhaps a way to avoid that confusion, which has already caused significant
damage, is to say that EU competition law is driven by a “dynamic competitive
168
process” model. But EU competition law is ultimately inseparable from the
treaty in which it is embedded (whose character is revealed through the wellknown canons of interpretation of the ECJ, including selectively applied
169
teleology ). From the point of view of the ECJ, the objectives of the competition
rules must be situated coherently within the objectives pursued by the treaty as a
170
whole. Therefore, even the designation “dynamic competitive process” is a
165. Eleanor Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors, 26 WORLD COMPETITION 149,
section III (2003). This is a recurring theme in Fox’s work. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 130, at 86; Fox, Linked-in,
supra note 49, at 153 (the European institutions protect “dynamic rivalry, market access, and the competitive
structure of the market”).
166. In my view, one way to underline the difference in usage is to note that in the EU, the term
“competitive process” is used when an authority seeks to intervene, whereas in the US the term is more often
used to caution against false convictions in cases of aggressive market conduct. By way of digression,
protecting the competitive process in the EU context must be reconciled with the prohibition of excessive prices
under the EU case law, whereas even the highest monopoly prices cannot be touched by Section 2 of the
Sherman Act outside the realm of de facto essential facility cases. See, e.g., Deutsche Telekom, 2010 E.C.R. I9555. Although it may not be immediately obvious how the excessive pricing offense can fit with the
competitive process paradigm, one could say that an appropriate remedy in such a case under Article 102 TFEU
is the dismantling of (artificial) entry barriers that enable the dominant firm to charge exorbitant prices. Such a
remedy would then permit the competitive process to reassert itself.
167. See Monti, supra note 11, at 352-354 (discussing the ICN Report on the Objectives of Unilateral
Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-created Monopolies of 2007,
and noting the language difficulty).
168. My tentative use of the term “dynamic competitive process” is not to be confused with the identical
term used by Blair in a different context. See Douglas Blair, On Variable Majority Rule and Kramer’s Dynamic
Competitive Process, 46 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 667 (1979).
169. See, e.g., JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 233-270 (1993) (discussing the Court’s various interpretive
techniques). The idea that the Court uses teleological reasoning selectively may arguably be supported by its
recourse to literalism in some instances. See id. at 234-237. Many other studies are devoted to the styles of
reasoning employed by the ECJ. See, e.g., ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, 2 EDITION,
chapter 16 (2006).
170. See, e.g., Lianos, supra note 125, at 2. For a recent statement of the systematic interpretation
argument, particularly with reference to the post-Lisbon era, see Suzanne Kingston, Competition and
Environmental Protection: A Case of Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL
2012: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND PUBLIC POLICIES 113 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2014). The
significance of new or altered provisions in the Lisbon Treaty has been observed by other scholars as well. See,
e.g., Ioannis Lianos & Arianna Andreangeli, The European Union: The Competition Law System and the
ND
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simplification that should be used with caution. An alternative term that has been
171
put forward aspirationally is “holistic” competition law. This too calls for
caution, as holism might be over-inclusive and could be turned into an epithet by
critics quick to equate a complex goal structure with rule by expansive discretion,
unpredictability, and errors in both directions, resulting in over-deterrence as well
as under-deterrence.
3. Competition between the American and European Approaches to
Competition Law
The U.S. model (emphasizing outcomes first and last) and the more
complicated EU model (treating outcomes as important but giving process the
172
final word) are rivalrous and ultimately, it would seem, irreconcilable —even if
173
in general they may converge on case results. How have the two models fared?
It may come as no surprise that the European Community/European Union model
of competition law has enjoyed far more success on the “market” than has the
U.S. model. Although further research should detail jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
why the “output” or “double helix” has not been more readily accepted in the
majority of jurisdictions worldwide, the general reasons may be stated without
difficulty. In the 1970s, when antitrust was transformed in the U.S., the few
jurisdictions elsewhere with fully functional competition law systems

Union’s Norms, in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 384, 406-407 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael
J. Trebilcock eds., 2013). For extensive critical discussion of the aims of competition law in the EU (using the
U.S. as a comparative case), see BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN
ANTITRUST POLICY? NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU (2012).
171. See Lianos, supra note 125, at 47-62.
172. Cf. Monti, supra note 11, at 353 (referring to a “fundamental schism” between “those who believe
that one should merely protect the process and not consider the likely outcomes (on the basis that beneficial
outcomes will result provided we ensure markets remain competitive) and those who think that absent proof of
anticompetitive effects in terms of higher prices or reduced output, one is likely to over-enforce the law,
reducing economic welfare” (footnote omitted)).
173. Notwithstanding the relevant differences, Monti warns against assuming that a welfare-driven
approach and a European “traditionalist” approach will diverge on outcomes; such will be the case only on the
margins. See generally Monti, EU Competition Law from Rome to Lisbon—Social Market Economy, in AIMS
AND VALUES IN COMPETITION LAW 27, 45 (Caroline Heide-Jorgensen, Christian Bergqvist, Ulla Neergard &
Sune Troels Poulsen eds., 2013) (“Three beliefs underpin the traditionalist response: first, economic freedom is
more important than efficiency; second, monopoly is less likely to yield economic benefit than competition;
third, it is hard to predict all welfare effects. This is the essence of the difference, which will arise only rarely.”
(footnote omitted) Monti’s example of where outcomes would diverge is a proposed “merger to monopoly” that
would be efficient inasmuch as it would reduce the production costs of the merged entity, which then may or
may not entail reduced prices for consumers. Clearly, “traditionalists” would decline to approve such a merger,
whereas adherents of the efficiency paradigm would merely insist on rigorous evidence of the claimed
efficiencies. This example highlights the fact that a pure efficiency approach, as opposed to a genuine consumer
welfare approach, omits or at least yields to other policy domains the additional distributive question of whether
consumers will truly benefit from the efficiencies gained as a result of the merger. The assumption, rather, is
that society will be better off when such efficient elimination of rivalry is allowed.
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(essentially, Germany and the European Economic Community ) already had
intellectual foundations underpinning their competition law paradigm which
precluded a reductionist output model. In the 1980s and especially the 1990s,
when interest in competition law around the world began to surge, the countries
adopting new competition laws—mostly developing countries—realized that
their needs and background conditions were quite different from those of the
175
U.S. As Dan Crane suggests, for example, “many developing countries weren’t
176
ready to adopt an antitrust policy that seemed designed to do very little.” Crane
adds that the EU “arguably filled the gap and became a much more important
source of ideas for developing antitrust regimes like China, India, South Africa,
177
and Brazil.”
Eleanor Fox—who was herself instrumental in the early
development of the competition laws of certain developing countries such as

174. In Japan, the JFTC in the 1970s reasserted itself and began to make a rather dramatic impact (until
competition policy faded again in the 1980s), but nevertheless it would be a stretch to characterize Japanese
competition law even in the 1970s as fully functional. Marquis & Shiraishi, supra note 34. There were other
competition law regimes in place in the 1970s, of course, but each was held back by a variety of factors such as
faulty legislative drafting, institutional and political economy factors, overbroad exemptions and so on. For
example, competition law enforcement in India under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969
was notoriously weak. Another example is Australia, where, despite competition rules going back to 1906,
enforcement under the amended Trade Practices Act 1974 did not gain strong momentum until the 1990s
(largely by virtue of the recommendations in the 1993 Hilmer Report, supra note 161).
175. Sokol & Stephan, supra note 7, at 2.
o
176. Crane, Interview with Eleanor Fox: Networking the world, CONCURRENCES n 4-2011, at 2. It is
likely that Crane’s words, “designed to do very little,” are deliberately caricaturized in order to capture popular
perceptions of the Chicago school that might color its image abroad. In the first place, it has been argued that
Chicago’s normative edifice was not “designed” but was (re)constructed following successive analyses of
antitrust-relevant business practices conducted by, above all, Aaron Director and his students and associates in
the 1950s and 1960s. See Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 925,
926 (1979); William Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust
Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1989). (That seems to be a valid argument as
far as the grand Chicago syntheses of Posner and Bork are concerned: these were achieved in 1976 and 1978.)
Second, the question of whether Chicago antitrust essentially prescribes agency inaction (outside of cartel
enforcement) and presumptive case dismissal of private claims depends on which of its adherents is taken to be
its spokesman: Posner, whom Crane calls a Chicago School centrist, has by no means pleaded for a hands-off
antitrust policy. See Daniel Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1917-18
(2009) (enumerating fact patterns to which Posner has suggested antitrust liability rules are relevant).
177. Crane, supra note 176, at 2. Michal Gal and Jorge Padilla provide evidence of this in The Follower
Phenomenon: Implications for Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 899,
903, 920 (2010) (at least 43 jurisdictions have “copied” the EU’s prohibition on the abuse of dominance). Cf.
Heimler & Mehta, Monopolization in developing countries, supra note 131 (noting the popularity among
developing countries of an abuse of dominance provision that can be applied to excessive pricing scenarios,
unlike Section 2 of the Sherman Act; but also highlighting that developing countries have followed the
UNCTAD model law, which also covers compulsory contract terms that may directly or indirectly limit
competitors). Of course, it is not taken for granted that the literal replication of a foreign provision of law such
as Article 102 TFEU reliably indicates that its interpretation and enforcement will parallel or even compare with
the emulated jurisdiction, not least because the institutions responsible for these tasks are different (i.e.,
legislators are not normally charged with interpreting or applying the law). Nevertheless, the notable frequency
of the “grafting” of the EU rule seems significant. In some cases, Article 102 may have been perceived as
attractive on the strength of its own apparent merits and accepted spontaneously. In other areas, its acceptance
likely reflects active promotion by the EU, including by way of bargaining and/or conditionality.
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South Africa—shares Crane’s assessment: “The EU has a more copious view
than the U.S. of harm to competition. It seeks to preserve competitive rivalry in
concentrated markets and to safeguard openness and access (albeit sometimes
without a sufficient rudder). Openness of markets is in the DNA of Europe. EU
law is more sympathetic to economies that have suffered severe blockage of
markets as a result of pervasive state ownership, privilege, cronyism, and
178
discrimination.” Of course, the U.S. has not failed in all respects when
promoting competition policy ideas. The use of leniency programs by
competition agencies worldwide in their efforts to detect cartels, and the
punishment of cartels by sanctions of “felony” rather than “misdemeanor”
179
intensity, seem to be quite successful U.S. exports, even though the criminal
law gambit for cartel conduct remains immature or embryonic in most
“importing” jurisdictions due to institutional impediments and/or reasons of
180
culture. Another idea that the U.S. has pushed with some success (in Europe
and elsewhere) is that, as alluded to above, outside of hard core categories of

178. Crane, supra note 176, at 3. With regard to the way U.S. antitrust is perceived from the outside, see
GERBER, supra note 4, at 204 (“US experience has long been at the center of the competition law story, but the
path of US antitrust law development and the set of issues included within it appear narrow from a global
perspective. In comparison with European experience and issues, they often have limited relevance to decision
makers in other countries and to the issues of global competition law development that many others consider
important.”). Further discussion is provided in id. at 160-161 (pointing to factors that make the EU experience
resonate more with numerous other jurisdictions, including, for example: the history of state ownership and
privilege mentioned by Fox; the use of competition law to oppose excessive economic power; Europe’s civil
law tradition and its clearer dividing line between public and private law institutions; and the role competition
law has played in Europe’s process of political and economic integration).
179. It has been explained that beginning in the 1990s and roughly through 2001, while the U.S.
succeeded in stirring up worldwide interest in the fight against cartels and secured at the OECD a 1998 Council
Recommendation against “hard core” cartels, the substantive areas to which the European Community had been
seeking to draw attention—abuse of dominance and vertical restraints—faded into the background. See Fox,
Linked-In, supra note 49, at 156-157. In footnote 17 of her article, Fox describes this turn of events as a U.S.
“victory.” If this process is seen as a global struggle, one might also say that it reflected externally Europe’s
introspective modernization experience in the 1990s. That is to say, seeds had already been sown which
eventually led the European Commission to reassess priorities internally and to devote far more attention to
hard core cartels than to vertical restraints. Arguably, this means that the victory dynamic to which Fox refers
partly manifested itself earlier, not so much in the global antitrust discourse but in complex diffusion elements
that more directly concerned the interplay between U.S. and EEC/EC antitrust (which cannot be explained
adequately in the context of this essay). The story with regard to abuse of dominance problems is somewhat
more complicated, and this is where the victory is arguably most apparent, as non-interventionism in this regard
probably did not reflect the preferences of the EC/EU even taking account of its internal evolution and
investigations.
180. See Harry First, Your Money and Your Life: The Export of U.S. Antitrust Remedies, in COMPETITION
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 167 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013) (discussing institutional variations in criminal
penalties in a sample of 13 jurisdictions and noting that, with exceptions, few price fixers really go to jail
outside the U.S.); Donald Baker, Trying to Use Criminal Law and Incarceration to Punish Participants and
Deter Cartels Raises Some Broad Political and Social Questions in Europe, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW
ANNUAL 2011: INTEGRATING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW—IMPLICATIONS FOR
COURTS AND AGENCIES 41 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2014) (questioning the cultural ripeness of
criminal sanctions in the European context and suggesting a variety of alternative administrative tools that could
be used as substitutes to achieve deterrence objectives).
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irredeemable conduct—horizontal price fixing, market sharing, bidrigging and
the like—competition problems should be resolved only after an assessment of
181
their competitive effects has been conducted. Nevertheless, by and large the
picture presented by Crane and Fox rings true: the EU-oriented ideas of open
market maintenance and faith in prophylactic market intervention by public
institutions have been broadly accepted worldwide; the Chicago model has in
general been studied more for its pitfalls than for its accuracy and
appropriateness. Lest we leave the impression that the EU paradigm is a
universally irresistible model, however, it may be added that many developing
countries are searching for a competition policy that goes beyond that of the EU.
The overriding imperative for these countries is economic development.
Competition law is often seen as a tool of development policy insofar as having
182
such a law in place can support growth, and of wealth redistribution insofar as
it can ameliorate inequitable wealth transfers and distortions associated with
181. This idea was actively promoted to undercut a tradition of competition law enforcement in the
European (Economic) Community whereby many competition problems could be solved on the basis of
categorical reasoning. For example, it was often assumed by EEC/EC enforcers that if restrictions in a vertical
agreement were designed to provide territorial protection for a distributor, the agreement was ipso facto inimical
to the ideal of market integration, and fell necessarily to be condemned irrespective of possible countervailing
effects—an insufficiently nuanced view. In the field of unilateral conduct by a firm with a dominant market
position, it was traditionally believed (and may still be believed by the EU Courts—a matter to be revealed
when a pending controversy reaches final judgment) that conditional sales discounts that create fidelity on the
part of customers were ipso facto inimical to the “competitive process,” and that there was no need to delve
further into the presence/absence of anticompetitive distortions or efficiency effects. Fox & Crane, supra note
178.
182. It seems clear that a functioning competition law regime is not, strictly speaking and all else equal, a
necessary condition for economic growth. See, e.g., Thomas Ulen, The Uneasy Case for Competition Law and
Regulation as Decisive Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China, in COMPETITION POLICY AND
REGULATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA, THE US AND EUROPE 13 (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang
eds., 2011); Aditya Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A
Historical-Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 58-59 (D. Daniel Sokol et al.
eds., 2013). (The possibility of growth absent effective competition law, at least where conditions are ripe, is
not confined to Asia. To cite just two examples: the U.S. economy grew at a rate of around 7% from 1869 to
1879; and the Italian economy grew at rates of 6% to 8% between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, thus
ramping up essentially before the EEC competition law system could even partially compensate for the lack of a
genuine Italian competition law.) Nevertheless, several studies have indicated a positive correlation between
effective enforcement of competition laws in developing countries and increased economic growth. See, e.g.,
John Preston, Investment Climate Reform Competition Policy and Economic Development: Some Country
Experiences, Case Study Commissioned for the U.K. Dept. of Int’l Dev. (2003), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/477365-1327693758977/8397896-1327771331430/
dfid_preston_10.pdf (noting the need for more country-specific analysis); Fox & Gal, supra note 12, at 2-3,
with references. And empirical research seems to confirm that sectors marked by competitive pressures tend to
exhibit greater relative productivity. See e.g., Mateus, supra note 31, at 117-118, with references. It may
therefore be unsurprising that, when other growth models, such as Chalmers Johnson’s “developmental state”
model, reach a point of exhaustion and diminishing returns, a government may consider a stronger commitment
to competition, and a corresponding shift away from excessive intervention or discriminatory industrial policy,
as essential factors contributing to productivity and growth or at least buffering against the possibility of worse
conditions. Cf. Marquis & Shiraishi, supra note 34. In this sense, discussions of whether a functioning
competition law regime is a necessary condition of growth should consider the prospects of sustained growth
and should take account of a country’s medium-term and long-term economic evolution.
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(possibly state-supported) market power. The question of how to integrate
development and social inclusion objectives (which may be commingled with
cultural specificities as well) within a competition law framework is thus in many
184
parts of the world an issue of immediacy and prime importance.
4. Widening of the Geographic Field and of the Competitive Parameters
The implicit contest between U.S.-born and E.U.-born ideas does not exhaust
the competitive field in this context. The impulse to develop and advocate
competition-related ideas and concepts is also felt in other discrete jurisdictions.
Examples of such jurisdictions can be mentioned only briefly here, but one of
185
them is the United Kingdom. The now-retired Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for
many years sought to provide intellectual leadership via its unusually prolific
publication of studies, surveys and introspective initiatives on a variety of
186
187
subjects. The OFT’s efforts had a persuasive impact in foreign quarters, and

183. One notable version of this perspective is that (notwithstanding the caveat of the previous footnote)
effective competition law promotes functional markets, and well-functioning markets are essential to
developing countries because of their intertwined instrumental and ethical characteristics. Markets produce
wealth necessary for economic development and for the protection of human rights, each of which are necessary
conditions for self-actualization and socioeconomic mobility; and they constitute (on both the supply and
demand side) a social institution wherein, provided the possibility of participation is assured, personal freedom
can flourish. See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985) (discussing opportunities
(capabilities) as an alternative measure of well-being); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 4-6 (1999)
(also cited in several recent studies such as: Robert D. Anderson & Anna Caroline Müller, Competition and
Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02 (Feb. 20, 2013), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201302_e.pdf); Bhattacharjea, supra note 182, at 63; D. Daniel
Sokol, Thomas Cheng and Ioannis Lianos, Introduction, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 5 (D.
Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013). As the latter authors state: “If one were to subscribe to the freedom-based
approach to economic development [. . .], one might need to incorporate in competition law analysis special
considerations about the impact of competitive behavior on the poor’s access to education, health care, and
other essentials in life.” Id. This could be done, perhaps controversially, at a micro level in individual cases, but
at a minimum and more importantly it could be done as a matter of policy planning, prioritization, advocacy and
joint international efforts. See also Anderson and Müller, supra; Bhattacharjea, supra note 182, at 62-65; Zsofia
Tari & Jeremy West, Background Note, in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND
POVERTY REDUCTION 1, DAF/COMP/GF(2013)1 (2013)). In any case, once again, a long-term and optimistic
perspective would suggest that the role of equity-based redistributive concepts incorporated within competition
policy as a means to address extreme socioeconomic inequality (and hence extreme political inequality) can be
re-evaluated at a later point in time—particularly as applied, if at all, at the micro level—if a developing country
“graduates” to middle income status with tolerable levels of wealth distribution and mobility.
184. See Mor Bakhoum, A Dual Language in Modern Competition Law? “Efficiency Approach” versus
“Development Approach” and Implications for Developing Countries, 34 WORLD COMPETITION 495 (2011)
(advocating a hybrid concept of “efficient development”); see also Dina Waked, Competition Law in the
Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and its Implications for International Competition Law, 1
GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 69, 82-84 (2008).
185. See, e.g., William Kovacic, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2 CENTURY—
THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf.
186. One may just cite here a small sample of these internally and externally prepared studies, with the
following titles: The Impact of Reverse-Fixed Payments on Competition; The Economics of Secondary Product
ND
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were likely intended, in part, to have that effect. It will not be surprising if the
new Competition and Markets Authority follows this pattern. Another example
of a competition authority staking a claim for itself by providing intellectual
leadership and thereby “punching above its weight,” to use this phrase again, is
the Swedish Competition Authority (i.e., the Konkurrensverket). For the last
decade the Swedish authority has been hosting annual conferences with noted
188
experts (“the pros and cons of X practice”) and publishing the proceedings.
In a different vein but still in relation to the power of ideas, and with a clear
connection to the contrasting “systems of belief” marking U.S. antitrust and EU
competition law, one may also refer to the alternative conceptions and objectives
of the defense of competition in jurisdictions worldwide. A notable example in
this regard is South Africa, where the idea of competition law cannot be confined
exclusively to concepts such as economic efficiency, well-functioning markets,
189
or the freedom to compete, among others. In South Africa antitrust has been
partly conceived of as contributing to a post-Apartheid form of economic
democratization, to borrow a phrase normally used in discussions of certain
190
Asian countries. Concerns relating to employment impacts, Black Economic
Empowerment, and more generally protection of the public interest partly define
191
its distinctive “goal structure,” and understandably so. Apart from the terms of
the law, the decision-making of the South African Competition Tribunal has been
192
praised for being “specifically tailored to the goal of inclusive development.”
In short, and although the appellate courts have occasionally rejected the
Markets; Competition and Growth; Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition; The Competition Impact of
Environmental Product Standards; The Competitive Effects of Buyer Groups. See id. at 79-80.
187. For example, the OFT’s work on prioritization of agency activities and the resulting report issued in
2008 attracted the interest of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. See id. at 88-89, 116 (reviewing the
approaches of several other authorities as well; it is not suggested here that the OFT was uniquely influential).
188. Since 2002, the Konkurrensverket has hosted Pros and Cons conferences covering a variety of
competition-related subjects including consumer protection, standard setting, vertical restraints, high prices, low
prices, information sharing, the pros and cons of merger control, and more pros and cons of merger control. See
Arvid Fredenberg, Ten Years of Pros and Cons Conferences, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (August 2012 (1)).
189. See, e.g., Bakhoum, supra note 184 at 495.
190. The South African version of economic democratization is described in part by Lewis, supra note
29, at 233 (Robust antitrust was to be an instrument “whereby the economic kingdom would be conquered by
the post-apartheid rulers. [. . .] [C]oncentrated markets and centralized ownership structures, and the powerful
interest groups that they supported, were going to be fragmented.”). A Kenyan perspective on the idea of
economic democracy to parallel political democracy is referenced in the speech of Uhuru Kenyatta. Kenyatta,
supra note 56.
191. See, e.g., Trudi Hartzenberg, Competition Policy and Enterprise Development: the Role of Public
Interests in South Africa’s Competition Policy, in COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND COMPETITION POLICY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 136 (Paul Cook, Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee eds., 2007) (discussing the public interest
objectives in the South African context). The reference in the main text to “goal structures” is borrowed from
David Gerber, The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL
2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC 37, 110 (Philip Lowe & Mel Marquis eds., 2008).
192. Fox, supra note 12, at 284. Moreover, competition law has been used in South Africa (by the
Competition Commission) to remedy what may also have been a failure of public health policy, in particular in
the context of the pharmaceutical sector and medicines for HIV patients. See Monti, supra note 11, at 364.
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purposive statutory interpretations of the Tribunal, South Africa has produced a
194
novel, culturally attuned philosophy of competition law. The model may not
travel well to other social settings that lack a history or present reality of extreme
economic inequality and/or caste-like social strata analogous to those that have
afflicted South Africa. Yet the idea that competition policy can be a tool to
destabilize entrenched social structures, promote socioeconomic mobility and
195
alleviate poverty may resonate in a large number of countries. David Lewis
argues, moreover, that a competition authority can be well-positioned to balance
between competition issues, such as market power and efficiency, and seemingly
incommensurable public interest issues such as employment impacts and small
196
business concerns. If a country follows in the footsteps of the South African
legislator and competition authorities, it should however also plan for the
accumulation of the necessary political capital and coalition partners, and ensure
that it has the necessary legal mechanisms, to add to its portfolio the contestation
197
and dismantling of unjustified state-imposed restrictions of competition.
Further, the authority entrusted to balance competition and non-competition

193. See Janice Bleazard, Pigeon-Holed by Precedent: Form Versus Substance in the Application of
South African Competition Law, in BUILDING NEW COMPETITION REGIMES 81 (David Lewis ed., 2013).
194. See Dennis Davis & Lara Granville, South Africa: The Competition Law System and the Country’s
Norms, in DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS 266 (Eleanor Fox & Michael Trebilcock eds., 2013)
(providing a fuller picture of competition law in South Africa and of the problems facing it).
195. The links between competition policy on the one hand and poverty reduction, inclusiveness and
mobility on the other have stirred great interest. For example, the African Competition Forum states that its
principal objective is “to promote the adoption of competition principles in the implementation of national and
regional economic policies of African countries, in order to alleviate poverty and enhance inclusive economic
growth, development and consumer welfare by fostering competition in markets, and thereby increasing
investment, productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship.” Press Release, African Competition Forum, African
Competition Forum launched in Nairobi (Mar. 8, 2011). According to researchers at the OECD, the links
between competition policy and poverty, and the possible ameliorative effects of competition policy, require
further empirical research; in the meantime, competition authorities should prioritize their work taking into
account impact on the poor (e.g., by focusing on essential goods and services, banking and communications),
and they should actively engage in advocacy to encourage market-based policies and to counter-balance vested
interests. See Tari and West, supra note 183; See also Anderson and Müller, supra note 183.
196. See David Lewis, Contribution to the Global Forum on Competition (Competition and Poverty
Reduction), DAF/COMP/GF(2013)3 (2013) at 7-11, available at http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/GF(2013)3&docLanguage=En. In the context of the EU, the
European Commission sometimes acts, theoretically under the control of the EU Courts, as mediator of a range
of interests unconfined to competition concerns strictly defined. See Monti, supra note 21, at 15-16 (citing
Giandomenico Majone, Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance, 2 EUR.
UNION POLITICS 103 (2001) (defining Commission as a “trustee” rather than merely an agent, and as a part
owner of the policies for which it is responsible). With specific regard to Article 101(3) TFEU, whose breadth
continues to provoke debate, the Commission’s role as mediator of interests raises questions as to how to define
the role national courts and agencies ought to play when applying that provision (or when applying EU
competition law generally). Different solutions could have different consequences for the principle of the
uniform application of EU law. See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 136, at 159-160 (presenting, briefly, this set
of dilemmas).
197. See Lewis, supra note 29.
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concerns should be prepared for the possibility that such a mandate might attract
198
ad hoc attempts by government officials to influence that balance.
As yet another example in the context of alternative visions of competition
policy goals one may also mention China. In the People’s Republic, competition
law is now presented as an integral part of the socialist market economy and
serves, in tandem with (albeit in conflict with) industrial policy as an instrument
199
of State-led capitalism. China’s competition law framework (which must be
considered together with the country’s institutional features, including a highly
200
specific judiciary ) has borrowed some genetic materials from the EU model but
it is in its present state a far cry from its cousin and bears only a slight
resemblance. Chinese competition law presents yet another model from which to
“choose”—potentially a rather appealing one for countries not ready to cut their
economies free from the umbilical cord of the State—or for countries with
changing preferences wishing to restore a close connection that has been lost.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article emerges from preparations for a workshop focusing on the
transnational circulation of policy paradigms wherein the case study chosen was
the field of competition law. The argument presented in the foregoing text is that
policy paradigms in this context are actively pushed and pulled according to
forces analogous to those of the market, and that policy entrepreneurs (typically
competition law agencies) operate in a setting where—notwithstanding various
cooperative platforms—competition and rivalry occur and manifest themselves
along a number of dimensions. An important premise of the article is thus the
notion advanced by other scholars that competition enforcers across jurisdictions
compete among themselves on a global market. Building on that premise, an
attempt has been made to elaborate on certain arenas or “modes” through which
such competitive behavior is pursued. With the multiplication of antitrust
jurisdictions around the world, which may act simultaneously as both “sellers”
and “buyers,” new competitive opportunities may likewise emerge. While the
article has not dwelled upon the normative desirability of global “yardstick”
competition among rival agencies, the alternative would promise little if any
198. See id. at 243 (describing intrusions by a senior official of the South African Department of Trade
and Industry).
199. See e.g., Mel Marquis, Abuse of Administrative Power to Restrict Competition in China: Four
Reflections, Two Ideas and a Thought, in THE CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 73, 87-88 (Michael Faure &
Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2013) (discussing the concept of the socialist market economy).
200. Recently and encouragingly, some efforts have been made at the level of the central government to
rein in the habitual interference with the judicial process by local officials. See e.g., Keith Zhai, Courts See Less
Cadre Meddling in Judgments, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, December 13, 2013, at A6. However, judicial
independence in China is bound to remain merely relative in nature. There is little doubt that the judicial
process will remain subject to intervention in politically sensitive disputes, whether the intervention is
surreptitious and unapproved by the political hierarchy or whether it is done by order from above.
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dynamism, adaptability or motivation for innovation and agency selfimprovement.
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